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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to investigate if 
regionalism in India would cause the secession of any of its 
parts into independent states.
Two case studies are used: North-East India and Punjab.
North-East India is examined during the years of riots 
which developed into large scale violence from 1979 to the 
signing of an agreement between New Delhi and Assam in 1985.
Punjab was studied from India's post-independence 
status through the 1984 violence at the Golden Temple, which 
led to the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and 
to the signing of the accord between New Delhi and moderate 
Sikh leader Harchand Singh Longowal.
The thesis concludes by reiterating the theme of "unity 
through diversity" and illustrates that regional problems in 
India can be contained when the central leadership in New 
Delhi is responsive and deliberate in its actions.
v
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is entitled "Regionalism In India" and 
delves into the problem of regionalism, primarily prior to 
the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by Sikh 
extremists. In January 1985, her son, Rajiv Gandhi coasted 
to a landslide victory for Prime Ministership, while winning 
more than 50% of the popular vote for the first time in 
history.1 The decisive mandate reflected in part a longing 
in India for security and continuity.2 Rajiv has managed to 
appease various minority groups partially, launch his 
campaign against corruption, use business school theories 
and computer readouts3 rather than consulting astrologers, 
and combine tradition with innovation.4
Hence under his guidance the socio-economic and political 
situation has continued fairly smoothly, and will be used to 
substantiate my thesis that regionalism will not cause the 
disintegration of the Indian Republic.
My thesis will be divided into several chapters. The 
introduction will deal briefly with various views on the 
term "regionalism" as understood by political scientists 
Harry E. Moore, Merril Jensen, Jyotirindra Das Gupta, 
Clifford Geertz and Louis Snyder.
Moore uses the term "regionalism" in a narrow concept, 
emphasizing its geographic connotation with special focus on
climate and soil types,5 whereas Jensen undertakes an 
intense study of American history and the formation of the 
states to accomplish the task.
Das Gupta, Geertz and Snyder on the other hand display 
a more comprehensive and adequate view of the subject. They 
link together the multi-faceted social, cultural, ethnic and 
linguistic disparities between areas or regions which assist 
in causing regional loyalties or attitudes. Thus 
regionalism for these individuals is not only geographic, 
but all encompassing.
Das Gupta uses the term "regionalism" as an extension 
of various local points of view and states that this could 
help promote "political integration rather than 
disintegration".6 Geertz expounds the argument of natural 
versus civil ties, and Snyder utilizes the colonial 
background and formation of independent states to exhibit 
his attitude towards the subject. The only difference being 
that Geertz uses the term "primordial ties" and Snyder 
"mini-nationalism" instead of "regionalism".
The first chapter of my thesis shall expound the 
various views mentioned above on regionalism, but will also 
use for the main body of literature Selig S. Harrison's 
India: The Most Dangerous Decade as an important source on
the history of the evolution of regional loyalties, and the 
role they play in power politics in India.
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The second chapter shall deal with the case study of 
North Eastern India and its importance for regional 
politics in the country. The North East during the period 
between 1979-81 was in a state of turmoil regarding the 
issue of whether "foreigners" should be allowed to vote. 
These "foreigners" were people from the bordering states of 
West Bengal, Nepal and Bangladesh. The North Easterners 
felt that too many outsiders, mainly Bengalis, would swamp 
the vote in their own favor, shunting the native population 
to the position of second class citizens. Hence, they 
revolted against this so called illegitimate vote, striking 
against the government and causing a total breakdown of all 
communication within this region. Naturally when the issue 
could not be resolved through normal channels of 
communication, President's rule was imposed, and after a 
year of turmoil and turbulence, the situation was eventually 
stabilized by the central authority.7
The various books which shall be used to facilitate the 
writing of this chapter are Hill Politics in the North East 
by Shibanikinkar Chaube, Conflict in Nagaland by V.K. Anand, 
Social and Economic profile in North East India edited by B. 
Datta Ray, Problems of the Hill Tribes. North-East Frontier. 
1873-1962 by H.K. Barpeigoni and Minority Safeguards in 
India by K.K. Wadhwa. Regarding the daily events between 
1979-81, various newspapers articles, journals and literary 
magazines have also been utilized.
3
Both Hill Politics in the North East by Chaube and 
Conflict in Nagaland by Anand, undertake a fairly detailed 
study of the North Eastern region of India from the pre­
colonial period through the 1970s, the major difference 
being that Chaube blames separatist feeling in this region 
on British meddling, whereas Anand imputes British 
administrative efforts for similar results. Both books deal 
with the geographic, social, cultural, religious and 
linguistic aspects of this region, and also focus on the 
"psychological maladjustment" which gave birth to the 
conflict of minds between the hill and plains people.
Social and Economic Profile in North East India uses a 
geographic cum historical approach to demonstrate the 
formation of various tribes on an ethno-linguistic basis.
The author states that this was the main reason for the 
formation of separate states in North East India and 
continues to provide a challenge to the proponents of 
national unity in India.
H.P. Barpeigani's book on the problem of hill tribes 
uses a totally diverse approach to the subject. Barpeigani 
believes that the drawing up of borders on the whim of 
colonial powers did much to destroy the confidence of the 
hill tries. He states that with the introduction of the 
Inner Line to the extension of control to the McMahon Line, 
increased the contingency of border conflicts with China. 
Thus a strong united Peoples Republic of China began to pose
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a severe threat to the Indian government on its North- 
Eastern frontier and exacerbated the already unstable 
situation in this region. Barpeigani's account is based on 
historical events and the publics attitude towards these 
events.
Finally, K.K. Wadhwa's Minority Safeguards in India is 
an important source of information regarding the Indian 
Government's present policy towards the hill tribes. Mr. 
Wadhwa demonstrates through the use of Government data the 
various concessions and exemptions made to these minority 
groups in the North East. He states that not only are they 
exempt from the payment of income tax, but are also entitled 
to unremunerated education facilities which include tuition, 
stipends and scholarships, and specially reserved seats in 
all Government controlled or owned, offices and facilities.
The third chapter of my thesis will deal with the 
second case study, the Punjab. Through the efforts of the 
Indian Government with the Green Revolution, this region 
became a vital area of food cultivation for the Indian 
people. Unfortunately in the late 1970's, Mrs. Gandhi's 
proponents turned out to be her most fanatical opponents, 
when under the guidance of their leader Sant Bhindranwale 
they took over the prestigious Golden Temple at Amritsar and 
converted it into an ammunition cache. These militant Sikhs 
demanded an independent state of Khalistan on the basis of 
religion, and when Mrs. Gandhi refused to buckle under these
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demands, they decide to turn the Punjabi countryside into a 
battlefield. Eventually, Mrs. Gandhi gave orders to the 
Indian army to storm the temple, thereby killing 
Bhindranwale. Many politicians stated that this perhaps was 
her greatest political blunder. On November 1984, Mrs. 
Gandhi was assassinated by two of her own Sikh bodyguards, 
and communal riots between Hindus and Sikhs broke loose in 
most of Northern India. However, under the guidance of her 
son Rajiv Gandhi as the new Prime Minister, the situation 
appears to be under control, and legitimate Sikh demands are 
being studied by the Indian Government.
The various books consulted on the subject were Indira 
Gandhi Returns by Khushwant Singh, Minority Safeguards In 
India by K.K. Wadhwa, Gandhi and the Punjab by S.L.
Malhotra, Dynamics of Punjab Politics by Dalip Singh and The 
Evolution of the Sikh Community by W.H. McLeod.
Indira Gandhi Returns is an important book with regard 
to achieving insights into the Prime Minister's character. 
Mr. Singh, through his numerous interviews with Mrs. Gandhi 
assists in the understanding of the Prime Minister's psyche, 
and hence her attitude towards others, which helps the 
reader to realize the reason she had retained her Sikh 
bodyguards even after threats of assassination had been 
issued from numerous quarters.
Minority Safeguards in India is an important source of 
information on the formation of the state of Punjab on the
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basis of separate linguistic needs, after indian 
independence in 1947.
Gandhi and the Punjab on the other hand, deals with the 
political mobilization of the Punjabi populace under the 
direction of the Mahatma, before independence. The author 
demonstrates how an apathetic region was converted into a 
highly politicized state under the leadership of Gandhi. He 
also states the importance of control over the temples in 
this region not only as a political but also a financial 
leverage.
Dalip Singh's Dynamics of Punjab Politics is an 
extremely important source not only on the geographic, 
social and cultural aspects but also the political dimension 
to the present day problems of Punjab. Singh not only gives 
his reader a historical background but also describes the 
formation of the militant Akali Dal, the role it plays in 
Punjabi politics, the importance of the Green Revolution, 
and the impact of Congress Rule in this region. Singh 
concludes with a fairly concise overview of the situation in 
the Punjab until the late 1970's.
Finally, The Evolution of the Sikh Community by W.H. 
McLeod consists of five distinct essays of which only three 
are pertinent to this thesis. The usefulness of this book 
lies in the fact that it provides a keen insight into the 
composition of the Sikh body, its moral guidelines, ideals, 
work ethics and relationship with the Hindu community.
7
The concluding and fourth chapter of my thesis will 
present my main argument that regionalism will not cause the 
disintegration of the Indian Republic. Most of the above 
sources will be used to augment this view. Two additional 
books, Conflict in Indian Society and Inside India Today 
shall be utilized to counter my own views on the subject. 
Conflict in Indian Society by V.B. Kulkarni is an excellent 
book regarding the political situation in India during the 
1960's which led to "regional chauvinism plus communal 
disharmony",8 growing restiveness of the student community, 
challenges by industrial laborers and depressed classes,9 
causing the eventual "breeding storm"10 to continue to rage, 
burdening the country's excessive population and leading to 
frustration and despair amongst large sections of the 
population.11
Inside India Today by Dilip Hiro defends a Marxist 
point of view as against my own "centrist" position. Hiro 
is a strong champion of minority rights, however, the means 
of achieving these rights has led him to take an unpopular 
stand on the subject.
Finally, India in the 1980's by Philip Talbott shall be 
utilized to demonstrate by means of fairly recent 
statistics, the progress made in independent India since 
the Transfer of Power in 1947. Talbott manages to show his 
reader the enormous problems which the Indian government had 
to over come, and the considerable amount of progress made
8
in most areas of development.
Besides books, various newspapers, literary magazines, 
periodicals and journals shall also be utilized to help 
demonstrate to the reader that even though regionalism has 
existed from time immemorial, and does cause problems for 
the Indian government , the disintegration on India is not 
seen on the horizon, because underneath the surface, there 
is a basic ideal of "unity in diversity" prevalent amongst 
most people on the Indian subcontinent.
#############
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CHAPTER 1
WHAT IS REGIONALISM?
In the first chapter, the evaluation of the concept of 
regionalism will be reviewed, drawing on the views of 
authors Harry E. Moore and Merrill Jensen, who have 
researched the growth of regionalism in America, and the 
totally divergent view point seen in the work of Jyotirindra 
Das Gupta, Louis Snyder and Clifford Geertz. Selig S. 
Harrison's perspective on regionalism will provide a most 
useful summary of this discussion, due to its particular 
emphasis on the nature of regionalism in India.
Harry E. Moore states that in spite of its antiquity,
the
"...ideal of regionalism has not yet achieved a 
clear-cut definition which would be acceptable to all 
regionalists. A working idea of the notion might be 
stated in some such terms as these: A region is an area
large enough to display most social factors, distinctive 
enough to make recognition fairly easy, and possessed of 
a characteristic mode of life."1
Moore emphasizes that regionalism was "born of 
geographic study" and "always has to do with space...:"2
"...people cluster together and form institutions of 
various sorts which reach out into surrounding areas for 
part of their support. Cities and towns form an 
hierarchy of points of influence; the metropolis 
dominating the city, the city the town, the town the 
hamlet, and the hamlet the countryside.1,3
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However the influence has not always flowed in one 
direction. The rural districts also affect the cities, 
acting as a conservative force and slowing down the 
processes of change.4 Thus regionalism, as understood by 
Moore, in an American context, is a natural phenomenon, 
grown as a result of man's effort to
live together and supply common needs.5 It offers an 
escape from a national standardization and regimentation 
which would lead in the direction of mediocrity.6 Similarly 
it opposes the processes of disruption which would deny the 
necessity of co-operation and peace with neighbors.7 
Summarizing his views, he quotes the adage that "regionalism 
promotes union, but not unity."8
Regionalism in America utilizes the "sectional concept" 
to describe regionalism, and employs William Craigie's 
definition of the term section, as being "a distinct part 
of the country; a territory set apart by geographical, 
economic, or cultural lines."9 The book ranges over the 
period from about 1750 to 1900 opening with the 
consolidation of the old, far-flung system of sections 
within British America, it goes on to show how the "British 
American" system of sections that existed up to the 
Revolution was destroyed by war and independence, and was 
replaced after 1783 by a new contracted "American" system of 
sections.10 Differentiation between territories was made on 
the basis of divergent economics. In 1763 British America
12
consisted of an immense tract of land and islands ranging 
between the frigid and tropic zones.11 For example,
"...the valley of the St. Lawrence was narrowly 
inhabited by a resident population relying on farming and 
fur trading for support... Cape Breton and Nova Scotia 
were distinct from the St. Lawrence country and were 
recognized as such; timber-working, agriculture, and 
fishing dominated their economical activities."12
A system of sections characterized by local, 
differences and variations in climate and soil types was 
also prevalent. From "New Britain" (Hudson's Bay) on the 
north to the British West Indies on the south, the entire 
area was divided into numerous sections.12 Behind and above 
all these tidewater settlements which ranged from 
Pennsylvania to Georgia lay the "back country", and this 
"Indian country" beyond it, constituted still other sections 
in the system of sections that was being evolved in British 
America about 1765.14
Fenning and Collyer in A New System of Geography had 
devoted a series of chapters to the subject of American 
geography which bore the title "Of the Northern Part of the 
British American Dominions, Particularly of the Countries 
Bordering on Hudson's Bay; with the Islands of New 
Foundland, Cape Breton, and St. John."15 The following 
chapter was entitled "Of Nova Scotia, Canada, New England, 
New York, the Jerseys, Pennsylvania, and Maryland", and the 
Continent of America, Particularly of Virginia, Carolina, 
Georgia, and Florida."16
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Thus Fulmer Wood has summarized his stance on the
subject by indicating an emphasis on the geographic,
climatic and terra-types, together with local economics to
help differentiate one section or region from another. He
summarizes that,
"...given time, there arrives the moment when men in 
several sections looking at each other, and at 
themselves, come to the realization that they are not as 
their fellows are, nor are their fellows as they are.
Thus sectional consciousness has come to birth, and, 
therewith, consciousness of differences between 
kindred."l7
Jyotirindra Das Gupta in his book Language Conflict and 
National Development delves deeper into the problem and 
states that regionalism should be seen in its social, 
political, ethnic and lingual context. However, he stresses 
the problem of language conflict, as the most important 
aspect of regionalism, specially in developing areas.18 He 
further argues that "both in Europe and elsewhere the 
transformation of traditional societies into modern 
political communities"19 was usually accompanied by 
corresponding linguistic modernization. However, 
traditional societies appear to show extremes of linguistic 
diversity, in a sense that "in such societies, 
administration, religious affairs, literary activity, and 
ordinary communication tend to be carried on in different 
languages."20 Thus in an traditional society the use of a 
foreign language may be employed for administrative and 
religious affairs, whereas a variety of local dialects are
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employed by the general masses.21 Emphasizing John 
Gumperz's view on the subject, he states that low literacy 
and the considerable efforts needed for language training 
tended to favor polarization of power in a relatively small 
elite.22 Internal linguistic diversity thereby symbolized 
extremes of social and political stratification.23
Das Gupta concludes by suggesting that there is no 
reason to assume that sub-national or regional loyalties are 
necessarily inconsistent with national loyalties.24 He 
argues that social divisions are not automatically 
translated into political cleavages. Even when some of them 
are politically translated into political cleavages, there 
may be a wide variation in their direction, momentum and 
consequences. Hence, he reasons, not all political 
cleavages are translated into open conflicts, and even when 
they are, such conflicts may actually promote integration 
rather than disintegration.25
Snyder and Geertz have investigated the question of 
regionalism on the basis of its social, political, ethnic 
and lingual contexts. Snyder states that Asian nationalism 
started as a progressive, liberating force, only to descend 
into an unhealthy reaction after liberation. Along with the 
"creation of larger nationalisms came the expected plethora 
of unsatisfied mini-nationalisms."26 The pattern of 
centralization versus de-centralization was the same as on 
other continents.27 Post independence governments found
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themselves enmeshed in the usual problem of how to deal with
minorities in a plural society.28
"Such conflicts extended to all corners of Asia: Kachins
and Karens in Burma? Nagas in India; Sabahs, Sarawaks, 
and Singapores in Malaysia? Muslims in the Philippines. 
Everywhere in Asia it was the same story—  the 
centralized state versus rebel regionalists.1,29
These volatile peoples of Asia had their own ethnic, 
religious and linguistic differences.30 Their communal 
rivalries caused nation building to become a process of the 
"utmost complexity."31 Hence, cultural and religious 
differences were also accentuated by ethnic concerns. 
Throughout the vast Asian continent there were feuds between 
Hindus, Buddhists and Muslims.32 Added to religious and 
racial differences were linguistic rivalries which "broke 
the continent into a hodgepodge of opposing regionalist 
factions."33 More than three thousand languages and local 
dialects were distributed though Asia.34 Minorities were 
seen to hold to their special linguistic affinity, a 
practice which encouraged clashes with the central 
authority.35
"The same kind of linguistic drive governing the 
Basques in Spain, the Walloons in Belgium, and the 
Quebecois in Canada impelled varied Asian peoples to 
demand autonomy or independence."36
Finally, Snyder argues that invariably there are 
unsatisfied ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural 
sentiments resisting control from the center.37 "Unified 
centralism was threatened with becoming a dissolving 
factionalism, the familiar theme of an unsettled social
16
order throughout the world."38
Clifford Geertz does a thorough job of not only- 
explaining the term regionalism and applying it to several 
contexts such as the Indonesian, Ceylonese, Iraqi, Kurdish 
and Thai. He states that:
"Regionalism has been the main theme in Indonesian 
disaffection... The Tamil minority in Ceylon is set off 
from the Sinhalese majority by religion, language, race, 
region, and social custom? the Shiite minority in Iraq is 
set off from the dominant Sunnis virtually by an intra- 
Islamic sectarian difference alone. Pan-national 
movements in Africa are largely based on race, in 
Kurdistan, on tribalism? in Laos, the Shan states, and 
Thailand, on language. Yet all these phenomena, too, are 
in some sense of a piece. .. [of regionalism]1,39
Geertz furthers that each individual has one aim, which 
is a search for an identity, and a demand that identify be 
publicly acknowledged as being important, or "being somebody 
in the world."40 Unfortunately, tensions soon begin to 
develop between "...gross actualities of blood, race, 
language, locality, religion or tradition and of the 
steadily accelerating importance in this century of the 
"sovereign state as a positive instrument for the 
realization of collective aims."41
The author states that a more exact definition of the 
nature of the problem of regionalism involved is that 
considered as societies, the new states are abnormally 
susceptible to serious disaffection based on primordial 
attachments as against civil ones.42 By a primordial 
attachment is meant one that stems from the "givens" or 
"assumed givens" of social existence.
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"Immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but 
beyond them the givens that stems from being born into a 
particular religious community, speaking a particular 
language, or even a dialect of a language, and following 
particular social practices. The congruities of blood, 
speech custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, 
and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of 
themselves."4 3
Hence one is bound to one's neighbor of kinsman, hence, 
as a result not only of "personal affection, practical 
necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but 
also because of some unaccountable absolute import 
attributed to the very tie itself."44
Civil ties, on the other hand, are maintained not by 
calls to blood and land, but by a vague, intermittent and 
routine allegiance to a civil state, supplemented to a 
greater or lesser extent by governmental use of police power 
and ideological exhortation.45
In conclusion, Geertz maintains the havoc that is 
wreaked by both primordial and civil ties, has wrenched 
societies in divergent directions causing "competing 
loyalties of the same general order, on the same level of 
integration."46 Thus we find that Clifford Geertz has given 
us the most complete, and hence the most useful definition 
of the term "regionalism" and its use will help towards the 
general explanation of regional loyalties in present day 
India.
Regionalism in India is an extremely complex issue, as 
Selig S. Harrison has demonstrated. The concept will be 
developed here from an historical-physiographic perspective.
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The earliest recorded traces of civilization in India 
were the Dravidian, Monenjo Daro-Harappan civilization in 
North-Western India, which date to about 5000 B.C. These 
early dravidian cultures were probably pushed southward by 
the arrival of the Aryans from Persia some 1,500 years 
later.47 The light skinned Aryan nomads who crossed India 
from Persia brought with them a language (a branch of the 
Indo-European linguistic family) which, evolving into 
Classical Sanskrit, was to become the unifying medium of the 
new composite Hindu civilization.4® In the South, the dark 
skinned Dravidian people, with their own distinct Tamilian 
culture and script, developed as a parallel civilization 
within the South Asian subcontinent.
Even within their North Indian limits however, northern 
imperial rulers never established, up to Mughal times, more 
than the loosest sort of political control over the regions 
beyond their home bases.49 "Aggrandizement was a Hindu 
monarchic ideal; annexation was not."50 Although to secure 
his home base a king would occasionally annex his immediate 
neighboring kingdoms, but he did so normally for pillage and 
prestige and not for the extension of any permanent 
machinery of bureaucratic power.51 When the empire 
dissolved these annexed territories reverted back to their 
old independent status as a matter of course.52 Thus in the 
case of North India, the growth of separate regional 
identities in Gujarat, Bengal and Assam, for example,
19
persisted despite the recurrent subordination of these 
regions to the dominant Ganges heartland.
It was the Aryans who eventually imposed form and 
unity, discipline and order, on the culture which resulted 
from the interchange with the earlier Dravidian and Austric 
settlers? and the new Hindu scriptures, written in the 
language of the Aryans, had as their setting North Indian 
Aryan territory.53 Thus we see the early formation of 
regional identities on the basis of race and language, 
beginning to develop within the subcontinent.
Unfortunately, the political history of India cannot be 
examined by itself and must also be viewed with an eye to 
the physiographic differences within the country. Geography 
played an important role in the formation of various regions 
within the country. The west and east flow of so many 
rivers in a country lying north to south, accentuated the 
natural separation between the northern and southern plains, 
and a vast tableland in between.54
Harrison claims that soon India became sub-divided into 
three broad regions.
"The Ganges plain and its appendages were the most 
that any North Indian dynasty controlled..., the southern 
plains and their outworks all that most southern rulers 
say as their proper horizon, and the Deccan tableland 
the province of middle Indian emperors..."55
In the north, the Ganges basin, "one of the world's 
greatest expanses of rich, tillable soil, was hemmed in by 
the Himalayan ranges and the forested slopes and ragged
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desolation of central India, which constituted a great 
natural enclosure inherently destined for political 
consolidation."56 K.M. Pannikar stated that the eastward 
flow of the Ganges lead to the integration of populations in 
a closed area bound together by the river and its 
tributaries.57
In the center, the Krishna and Gadawari rivers, rising 
near the Arabian Sea and emptying some nine hundred miles 
away on the other side of the peninsula, gave a coast to 
coast unity to the Deccan.58
In the south, the Tamiland plains, stretching south and 
west as the peninsula receded inland from the Andhra coast, 
offered a decided contrast to the Deccan tableland lying 
above and beyond.59
Thus with these historic-physiographic divisions 
playing an important role, various regional, linguistic sub­
cultures soon developed within India. In the north the two 
major linguistic forces were Pali and Prakrit.60 These 
languages were passed on from generation to generation, 
through an oral tradition, largely in the custody of the 
priestly classes, substantially without change.61 Sometime 
around the 7th century B.C., Sanskrit evolved as the 
standardized language of the north.62 Sanskrit for many 
centuries thereafter was the one language of culture amongst 
the literati in all parts of India.63 Although universally 
recognized as the language of culture, and widely used by
21
the priestly and intellectual classes all over the country, 
classical Sanskrit was never the language of the common 
people who resorted to the use of Prakrit as the form of 
speech.64
The original Indo-Aryan Prakrit subsequently developed 
into Apabhramshas or spoken languages of the masses which, 
in their turn, evolved into the modern Indian languages.65 
Thus from the root language sprang western Hindi,
Rajasthani, Gujarati, and Bengali.66 Hence each region in 
Northern India developed its own language using Sanskrit as 
its basis, in much the same way that the romance languages 
of Europe evolved from Latin after the collapse of the Roman 
Empire.
In the south, the Tamil language has the oldest 
continuous literary tradition, followed by Kannada, Telegu 
and Malayalam.67 These languages were based on Dravidian a 
totally different script and are spoken almost exclusively 
in South India. However, even today, when we speak of 
linguistic areas or regions, we find that at the frontiers 
of each region the transition form one language to the next 
is not sudden but very gradual and almost imperceptible.68
In 1953 Andhra Pradesh was the first state formed in 
response to popular demand for a state border coinciding 
with a linguistic boundary.69 Thereafter many Indian state 
borders were reorganized to accord with language limits: 
Maharashtra state with the Marathi language, Gujarat with
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Gujarati, Tamil Nadu with Tamil, Kerala with Malayalam, and 
Karnataka with Kannada.70
Thus within each of the three basic arenas, regional, 
linguistic and political identities took form, as 
development progressed around agricultural core areas.71
However, Ashoke Dutt states that after language "the 
most pervasive element within the cultural landscape of 
India is religion.1,72 All traditions in India seem to be 
related to the Hindu social order.73 Hinduism, a native 
religion, has been defused throughout India form it s place 
of origin within the Indus plains.74 The Aryans who 
nurtured this religion form around 2,000 B.C.75 migrated 
eastward, settling almost all of the Indo-Gangetic plain.76 
The Aryans being racial but not religious fanatics77 found 
no difficulty whatsoever in borrowing the gods of the 
conquered races and giving them niches in their pantheon.78 
Hence the historical development and intellectual expression 
of Hinduism was the meeting and fusion of Aryan and non- 
Aryan elements. Unfortunately, in course of time, the fate 
that befell the Dravidians befell the Aryans too, and they 
in turn, were conquered by foreign races.79 But social 
intercourse with the foreign races and to be prohibited in 
order to preserve the racial purity of the Aryans.80 Hence 
each community that was admitted into the all-embracing 
Hindu fold, was organized into an independent social unit, 
with a definite status and a code of its own.81
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In religious matters however, a more lenient attitude 
was a d o p t e d . People were allowed to worship any gods they 
pleased and hold any vies they liked as long as these did 
not seriously challenge the fundamental principles of social 
organization.
Together with the development of Hinduism the caste 
system also flourished. This was a social rather than a 
religious phenomenon, and is the product of many centuries 
of immigration and geographical isolation.83 It was thus 
evident that the earliest phase of the caste system resulted 
from the conquest of one people by another of a different 
skin coloring.84 The old divisions were separated into 5 
grades: Brahmins (priests), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaisyas
(merchants or agriculturalists), Shudras (artisans and 
landless workers), and Pariahs (outsiders).85 Thus the 
additions of vast numbers (something over 2,000) of minor 
castes, either occupational, or due to conquests, and the 
effects of colonization, had complicated the system 
enormously.8 6
In the 6th century B.C., we witnessed the birth of a 
spiritual movement in India called Buddhism.87 This was in 
the nature of a reform movement within the Hindu fold. 
Buddhism was founded by Gautama Buddha who was born in 62 3 
B.C. at Lumbini (Northern India).88 The faith started with 
the basic principles of rebirth and Karma which were then 
accepted by Indian philosophers as truths.89 The Karma
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doctrine referred to the merits and demerits of a being in 
his past existences which determine his condition in his 
present life.90 Hence, on the death of a person, the only 
thing that survived is not the soul, as the Hindus believed, 
but the result of his action, speech and thought.91
About 2 50 years after the death of Buddha, the Indian 
emperor Asoka (273 B.C. - 232 B.C.) embraced Buddhism and 
sent Buddhist missionaries throughout India.92 Buddhism was 
made the state religion and spread rapidly to China, Burma, 
Ceylon, Tibet, Korea, Japan and Cambodia.
However, with the passage of time the number of 
Buddhists have gradually depleted from India due to a 
variety of causes. The wealth of the monasteries and the 
easy life soon attracted many undesirable and unworthy 
tenants into the fold. Also, the preponderance of monks 
over the laity, and the ritualism of Buddhism in its later 
stages detracted from its earlier simplicity and purity. 
Finally, the reorganization and revitalization of Hinduism 
under Sankara (788 - 850 A.D.) and the Muslim invasion of 
India in the 18th century all aided to bring about the 
decline of Buddhism on the Indian subcontinent.93
The 1981 census ed that the Buddhist population was 
about 5 million.94 The concentration of Buddhists are to be 
found in Maharastra and North-East India. The Maharastra 
neo-Buddhist movement was founded by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar who 
converted to Buddhism at a special ceremony with a large
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number of his followers from the so-called "untouchable" 
caste.95 This upset large sections of the Hindu 
traditionalists who felt that these conversions would side­
step the traditional caste system, thus elevating the lower 
classes.
The Buddhists of the North-East, especially the Chakma 
of the Chittagong and Lushai Hills and those Buddhists from 
Arunachal and Assam belong to the same school of Buddhism 
that prevails in Tibet.95 After the Third century B.C., 
when Asoka sent his son Mahendra and daughter Sanghmitra to 
Sri Lanka on a Buddhist mission, three streams of Buddhism 
developed in Asia. One stream went to Sri Lanka, Burma, 
Siam, Cambodia and Malaya. Another flowed to central Asia, 
and from there to China, Korea and Japan, and yet another to 
Tibet.97
The Muslim conquerors who came to India, had a 
traditional culture of their own and they believed that the 
salvation of mankind could be achieved only through their 
religion.98 They hated idolatry, and considered it their 
duty to remove it from the world.99 They had definite 
dogmas on religion, and the slightest deviation from them, 
even in thought, was belied to lead to eternal damnation.100 
While they held such strong views on religion, they had the 
most lenient social code in the world.101 They were free 
from many social prejudices and believed that all men were 
equal in the eyes of God, and that social inequalities were
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man made.102 Thus Islam, was in nearly every respect, the 
antithesis of Hinduism with its social rigidity and 
spiritual anarchy.103
In their first onrush the Muslims were extremely 
violent towards the Hindus.104 They destroyed Hindu temples 
and idols, plundered and forcibly converted the Hindus and 
put to the sword those who would not accept Islam.105 But 
with the occupation of India, the Muslims became responsible 
for the good government of the country and had to adopt a 
more conciliatory attitude towards Hinduism, the professed 
religion of the overwhelming majority of their subjects.106
Finally, the most modern Indian religion of any 
substantial proportion is Sikhism, and was founded by Guru 
Nanak in the Punjab in 14 69.107 Though Sikhism was 
monotheistic and adopted both Hindu and Muslim beliefs, W.
H. McLeod states that this did not constitute a synthesis of 
"Hinduism and Islam", but was a Sant synthesis, which Guru 
Nanak "reworked according to his own genius, and passed 
on in form unequalled by any other representative of the 
tradition."108 However, under Guru Amar Das, the second 
successor to Guru Nanak, various innovations were introduced 
which must be seen as concessions to social needs, not as a 
conscious shift in doctrine.109
During the period of Jahangir's rule (1605 - 1628
A.D.), due to the increase of Mughal hostility and fear of 
the growing power of the Sikh Guru, there was a large
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increase of a substantial number of Jat members. Jats were 
a rural and agrarian community, with strong martial 
traditions and for centuries constituted the elite of the 
Punjab villages.110 Hence, the growth of militancy within 
the Panth must be traced primarily to the impact of Jat 
cultural patterns. Yet it was only towards the end of 18th 
century under the able leadership of Maharaja Ranjit Singh 
that the Sikhs became a power to be reckoned with, and that 
Sikhism became the e religion in the Punjab.111 The 
religion remained confined mainly to it's area of origin 
until the 19th century, when relocation through migration 
took place.112
During the 1947 partition of India, may Sikhs from the 
Western Punjab Plain in Pakistan, migrated to the Eastern 
Punjab Plain in India.112 With the States Reorganization 
Commission appointed in 1955 by Prime Minister Nehru, the 
Akali Dal, the paramilitary political party of Sikh 
nationalism, increased their agitation for a "Sikh" 
state.114 The demand for a separate state of the Punjab 
(Punjabi Suba) was voiced not in communal, but in linguistic 
terms. Punjabi was the mother tongue of both Sikhs and 
Hindus, but communal passions had led large sections of the 
Hindu community to renounce the Punjabi language by naming 
their mother tongue as Hindi for census tabulation.115 
However, in 19 66, supposedly as a concession to the valour 
and suffering of the Sikhs in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965
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and partly due to the growing response in the Hindu speaking 
areas for a separate state of Haryana, the government 
announced that the Punjab would be divided into two units, 
Punjabi Suba and Haryana, corresponding to the regions of 
language dominance, thereby eventually satisfying Sikh 
demands based on the "totality of language conflict mixed 
with religious intransigence."116
Thus we may conclude that regionalism in India was not 
only historical, geographical, racial and lingual but was 
also based on religious lines and that religion played a 
very important role in regional politics.
Religion also molded many other aspects of Indian life. 
In a society in which tradition surrounds its inhabitants, 
where mobility is restricted for most persons, and where 
life expectancy was quite brief until very recently, 
religious attitudes have placed their stamp on a wide range 
of cultural features and processes.117 A prospective 
student of Indian society would shift his manner of greeting 
from the generally used "namaste" in Hindi or "namascar" in 
Tamil to a more specific religious greeting depending upon 
the religious community of the person greeted.118 Thus, if 
that person were a Muslim from the North West, the greeting 
is "salaam walekum" in Urdu and "Sat sihri akal" serves for 
the Sikh who speaks Punjabi.119
A second cultural area in which the influence of 
religion is pervasive is that of diet, food selection and
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customs. 120 Dietary habits in India are complex, regionally 
varied and strongly orientated towards religion.121 
Although most Hindus are vegetarians and will not consume 
beef, some non-Brahmins are not strict vegetarians and will 
eat fish, mutton and pork.122 Consumption of flesh among 
Hindus is closely related to caste us, with higher ranking 
castes exhibiting the greatest restrictions.123 Muslims on 
the other hand eat all meat except pork, Christians and 
parses have no taboos, whereas Buddhists and Jains are 
strict vegetarians and therefore, do not consume any kind of 
meat.124 The following example form the city of Calcutta is 
particularly revealing:
"In Burrabazara area...we find a large number of 
fruit stalls. Mechua Bazar Market has no fish or meat 
stall. This can be explained by the fact that the 
community composition of that area is of non-Bengali 
vegetarians. In the Muslim and Christian dominated 
localities there is a large concentration of beef stalls 
in the markets...In bengali Hindu-dominated localities, 
fish stalls predominate..."125
In conclusion, viewing the 5,000 year history of India 
we may observe that it was conquered by several different 
races, who spoke various languages, had special dietary 
habits, and followed disparate customs. It seemed natural 
that the separate regions with distinctive regional 
identities and loyalties would also evolve. Thus, a growth 
of regionalism began to take shape and this was soon to play 
a major role in shaping the political focus of New Delhi to 
the troubled areas of North East India and Punjab.
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CHAPTER 2 
ASSAM AND THE NORTH EAST
In order to evaluate the thesis that regionalism will 
not cause the disintegration of the Indian republic, two 
case studies, North East India and Punjab, have been 
utilized. In both these areas we have seen mounting tension 
leading to violence and bloodshed in the ten years from 197 6 
to 198 6, and yet in both cases a measure of understanding 
and rationality in centre-state affairs has helped alleviate 
the problem.
North-East India consists of five states (Assam,
Nagaland, Tripura, Manipur, and Meghalaya) and two union
territories (Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh) which form a
wedge between Bangladesh, Burma and China.1 This region is
enclosed by the "blue hills" that are made of the:
"..Eastern Himalayas on the north, the Naga Hills on the 
east, the Mizo and Tripura Hills on the south, and the 
Shillong plateau.... and Meghalaya on the west, form 
almost complete natural boundaries of the Brahmaputra 
Valley, the heartland of Assam."2
The entire region is connected to the rest of India by 
a thin neck of West Bengal, that at one point, is scarcely 
25 miles wide.3
For several centuries the valley and the hills of 
north-eastern India have been exposed to waves of invasion
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and migration. The province of Assam at the far 
northeastern corner of India is a museum of nationalities.
Of them, the Garo, living in the western parts of the 
Meghalaya plateau, had a legend of having migrated from the 
northwest, i.e. the southern side of central Tibet. The 
Khasi, at least some of them, claim to have migrated from 
southeast Asia, part of their route probably passing through 
Russia. The Kuki and the Chin inhabiting the southern hills 
of Manipur, Tripura, and most of the Mizo Hills, are 
supposed to be from southern China. The Naga, settled in 
Nagaland and the northern hills of Manipur, and some of the 
groups in the northeast are assumed to have immigrated from 
eastern Tibet.4 Thus, the northeast frontier is not 
inhabited by Indo-Aryans as is most of northern India, but 
by nomadic Mongoloid tribes who have strong ethnic and 
cultural connections with the people of China, Tibet, and 
Burma.5
Significantly, not even one of the regions' seven 
political units is bound by a common language of the 
original fold.6 Arunachal Pradesh, for example, has no less 
than 50 different languages.7 The Ao Nagas cannot follow 
the language of their neighbours, the Angami Nagas.8 The 
Khasi speech is almost Greek to the Garo's, although they 
belong to the same state, Maghalaya.9
The religious composition is no less complex. Hinduism 
reached the valley of Manipur probably in the 15th century,
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to which some Manipuri Brahmins trace their settlement.10 
The Chakma of the Chittagong Hills, a section of whom are 
now living in the Lushai Hills, profess Buddhism.11 Several 
sections of people from northern Arunachal belong to the 
same school of Buddhism as prevails in Tibet.12
Finally, since the late 19th century, Christianity has 
been embraced in the Garo, Khasi, Mizo, Lushai, and Naga 
Hills, by about half of the total population in this 
region.13
Thus after the British secured and blocked the 
boundaries of northeastern India, when they were eventually 
opened up to the rest of the country, this geographic, 
linguistic, ethnic, and racially isolated minority became 
apprehensive and obsessed with self-preservation.14 Though 
some observers may feel that the emotional links between the 
people of the northeast and the rest of India is tenuous,15 
in reality the differences amongst these various tribes are
as wide as the differences between them and the rest of
India. In older times, certainly, hostility among them
often went deep.16 Today, regional ties and affiliations
exist in abundance in northeast India, but it is important 
to note that this is not manifested in an individual seeing 
himself as a northeasterner; he is more likely, even today 
to see himself as Mizo, Naga, or Assamese.
This brief case study will consist of five parts.
After a brief description of the history of northeastern
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India, causes of building tension will identified. In the 
third section, the events leading to the violence of 1979-84 
will be probed. Fourth, an analysis of the case will be 
presented, and finally, a conclusion of the case of 
Northeast India will complete the chapter.
History of the North-East
The British entered the northeastern frontier from 
Bengal in the seventeenth century; as a result, the 
communications network was centered in eastern Bengal.
Assam was left as an appendage rather than as an integral 
part of British India.17 Early British records about the 
hills of northeast India were almost uniformly contemptuous 
of the "savage", "barbarous", and "primitive" tribes. These 
characterizations arose out of the hill peoples' dress, war­
like habits, and attachment to the recently condemned 
systems of headhunting, human sacrifice, and slavery.
Chaube states that the Angami, the legendary headhunters of 
the Naga Hills, were brilliant terrace cultivators in the 
pre-British days. The rice yield of western Angami was 
higher than the all-India average. The Serna, another object 
of early horror tales, had mastered the technique of 
preparing salt from brine springs.18 Cotton was widely 
cultivated and iron was in use in almost all the hills.19 
The tools may have been primitive, but their skills were 
not. Chie Nakane in the 16th century praised the economic 
system and method of wet-rice cultivation among the hill
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people.20
The immediate impact of British power on the hills was 
territorial. When in 1832, Upper Assam was restored to a 
subordinate monarchy, the Prince was granted limited 
authority on criminal justice and an unlimited authority on 
civil justice.21 Civil laws of the hills societies were 
based on customs of almost innumerable varieties, and so 
long as they did not affect British commerce, the British 
government had no intention of changing them.22
In 1872-73, however, the British saw an absolute 
necessity for bringing under more stringent control the 
commercial relations of the British subjects with those of 
the frontier tribes.23 Therefore, the government came to 
the conclusion that it was necessary to assume special 
powers and lay down special rules for regulating the 
relationship between the plains and the hill peoples.24 
This regulation gave power to the Lieutenant Governor of 
Bengal to prescribe the line to be drawn, "beyond which no 
British subject, and certain classes of foreigners, could 
cross without a license or pass."25 This Inner Line also 
prohibited "any subjects living inside the area from moving 
therein."26 Beyond this line the tribes were left to manage 
their own affairs with only such interference on the part of 
the frontier officers, in their political capacity, as might 
be considered advisable by the British authorities.27 The 
plains people argued that this was a device by which the
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British sought to alienate the tribal people from the 
peoples of the plains and thereby promote their imperial 
policies. It is true that the regulations were not enforced 
against the Christian missionaries but were imposed rigidly 
against the Indians, and that the Inner Line regulations 
generated a separatist tendency in the tribal people. Some 
have argued that much of the trouble in Nagaland and Mizoram 
today may be attributed to it.28
Bardolai, who along with Nichols-Roy and B. N. Rau 
drafted the Sixth Schedule of the Constituent Assembly, 
debated that:
"it is not unknown to you that the rule of the British 
government and the activities of the foreign missionaries 
always went together... During the war, the then rulers 
and officers developed in the minds of their tribal 
people a sense of separation and isolation and gave their 
assurances that at the end of the war they will be 
independent states managing their affairs in their own 
way. They were made to believe that the entire hill 
would be constituted into a province and put under some 
irresponsible government. You might possibly have read 
in the papers that plans were hatched in England in which 
the ex-governors of Assam evidently took part, to create 
a sort of kingdom over time."29
However, the growth of British administration in this 
region during the latter half of the 19th century and early 
2 0th century necessitated the building of small townships 
within the deep hills, the construction of pony or cart 
roads over the hills, and the introduction of a monetary 
system therein.30 During the two World Wars several hillmen 
had the opportunity to join the armed services and travel 
around the world.31
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Though trade was not unknown in the hills before the 
arrival of the British in this region, the bulk of it was 
done through a system of barter. Monetization of the entire 
hill area took place with the spread of British 
administration, and a small business community consisting of 
shop keepers and petty contractors was born among the 
natives.-*2 Thus, the offshoot of this limited monetization 
together with the early success of education helped in the 
creation of an embryonic middle-class among the indigenous 
people.33
Upon the attainment of independence in 1947, New 
Delhi's attitude was summarized by Prime Minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru, who stated that "we cannot allow matters to drift in 
the tribal areas. At the same time we should avoid over­
administering these areas. It is between these two extreme 
positions that we have to function."34 Ironically, it was, 
in fact, the very success of government policies in this 
area which led to increased tension.
Causes of Building Tension
There are actually four easily identified causes of 
building tension in the Northeast: firstly, the success of 
the measures undertaken by the government; secondly, the 
language conflict; thirdly, the Bengali attitude towards 
the indigenous peoples; and lastly, the volatile immigrant 
issue. Together these forces exacerbated existing tensions 
and led to the problems, unrest, and violence of 1979.
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The initial cause of the increased friction which 
developed in the Northeast from the 1950s through the 197 0s 
has been attributed by some, to the "success of the measures 
taken by the government. These have led to an awakening 
among the Schedule Tribes and given them the ability to 
stand up against vested interests. Now they are ventilating 
their grievances."3 5
The measures undertaken by the government of India in 
September 1950 were in pursuance of the provisions contained 
in Articles 16(4) and 335 of the Indian Constitution, which 
was intended to benefit these backward people, in more or 
less the same way the U.S.A. has employed it s Affirmative 
Action program. They made reservations for previously 
suppressed classes such as the Schedule castes, Harijans 
(the untouchables) and Schedule Tribes (peoples from the 
Northeast), in jobs under the government's control.36 
Through recruitment by open competition as well as other 
forms of recruitment, the reservation of posts for people 
belonging to Schedule Tribes was sealed at 5% of all 
vacancies, and in 1970 by orders issued by the Ministry of 
Trade Affairs it was further increased to 7.5%. The maximum 
age-limit prescribed was also increased by five years in the 
case of candidates belonging to Schedule Castes and Schedule 
Tribes.37 The fee's prescribed for the admission to any 
examination or selection to the service or post would be 
reduced to one-fourth for these special classes.38
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Because the general level of literacy was lower among 
these depressed or backward classes, the government of India 
began a campaign for the active participation in the 
educational development of these people.39 Besides the 
liberal allocation of funds and constructive programs for 
educational development, the government of India increased 
educational facilities which included free tuition, 
stipends, scholarships, free primary education, and the 
initiation of success scholarship schemes for post-graduate 
and research studies.40 Thus, it seemed to some that 
greater educational facilities had made larger sections of 
people more aware of their rights, and this new awareness 
had led them to revolt against vested interests.
Another cause for an increasingly aggravated situation 
was the language conflict and the Bengali attitude towards 
the Assamese peoples.
Initially, the British did not suspect that the native 
officers (who were aristocrats in their own society) 
imported from Bengal to help administer Assam, which was 
acquired in 1826, would usurp linguistic leadership and 
replace indigenous Assamiya with Bengali. But Bengalis who 
settled in Assam as the British East India Company's 
servants, exercised great influence on their masters.41 
During those years of Bengal cultural resurgence and 
upheaval, when Calcutta was the Capital of British India, a 
large exodus of educated Bengalis went both to Assam and
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Orissa, to run the administration. The Bengalis had a 
natural advantage in being the first to acquire the English 
language and British concepts, values and ideas, and both 
the language and the ideas enabled them to run the Raj. In 
the process Assamiya lost its position as the official 
language for about three decades. Although Assamiya was 
restored as the official language of schools and law courts, 
the Bengali language continued to play a dominant role in 
many spheres. Many Bengalis7 not only refused to recognize 
Assamiya as a rich and separate language, but considered it 
to be a vulgar dialect of Bengali.42 This may have been due 
either to ignorance or to a deliberate attempt to slight the 
indigenous language, but either way, its effect on the 
attitudes of Assamese toward Bengali domination, of which 
the language issue was a symbol, were long lasting.
Differences between these two peoples seemed to worsen, 
especially after independence. During the States 
Reorganization Commission7s work in the 19 60s, West Bengal 
began to demand that the Goalpara district of Assam be 
attached to it7s state, which immediately provoked the 
Assamese plea for the addition of Cooch Bihar to Assam.43 
Though the States Reorganization Commission maintained the 
status quo, the bitterness generated by the claims remained. 
Hence, in the 1960s the debate over Assam7s official 
language and language of instruction in college, between 
Bengali and Assamiya only caused further aggravation.44
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A further problem in the Northeast was the Bengali 
attitude towards the indigenous population. The Bengalis 
even after independence maintained a stance of superiority 
with regard to these people. They seldom mingled or 
participated in the cultural activities such as the "Bihar 
Festival" in Assam.45 Naturally, to the native population 
this smacked of the past British imperialist policies which 
could hardly be tolerated in independent India.
The major cause for friction, which developed into 
large scale violence in 1979, seemed to be the immigration 
issue.
Until 1947 the Northeast had been a sparsely populated 
region compared to the rest of India, and had been cut off 
from it due to the previous British policy of strict 
adherence to the Inner Line. Land was so readily available 
that traditional agriculture had been carried out by cutting 
down and burning trees to fertilize the land, and the land 
was cultivated until the soil became less productive, at 
which time the people moved on to new plots of land.46 From 
being left "largely to themselves" after independence, 
during the 1950s and 1960s these hill people were confronted 
with large scale immigration into their states by Bengalis, 
Nepalis, Orriyas, Madhya Pradeshis and East Pakistanis 
(later Bangladesh), who immigrated from areas of high 
density to the last valuable open ground closest to them.47 
Meanwhile, the inhabitants of those pockets in the northeast
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had learned that they had rights, and that they were 
threatened.48
Tripura state, where the native tribesman were 
outnumbered by Bengalis by the 1960s, was often cited by 
other residents of India's northeast as an example of what 
would happen to them if they did not rid their state of 
these "foreigners." In Assam, by 1979, five million of the 
state's nineteen million people were non-Assamese, and most 
of these were accused by the native Assamese of infiltrating 
from Bangladesh.49
Hence, the northeasterners were or became accustomed to 
their geographic, ethnic, lingual, and historic isolation 
and the new 'open door' policy of the Government of India 
seemed to threaten not only their cultural and ethnic 
traditions but also their political and economic status in 
their own state. These were the circumstances which set the 
stage for the events which led to the violence in the region 
in 1979.
Events Leading To The Violence
On Friday, November 2, 1979, in Assam, the local people 
began agitating against the registration of up to 200,000 
people who some Assamese organizations considered "illegal 
aliens." Mr. Y. B. Chavan, the Deputy Prime Minister in 
Charan Singh's government, tried to squelch this threatening 
electoral crisis arising out of a campaign against 
"outsiders.1,50
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The people who were the targets of these campaigns had 
lived in Assam for years, in some cases contributing greatly 
to the development of the forested region, which was 
sparsely populated in Indian terms. Part of this group came 
from Bangladesh, Bengali-speaking Muslims who, during the 
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, fled the poverty of what was then 
East Pakistan, and later became Bangladesh, for the 
opportunities of Assam.51 Another portion of those labeled 
aliens was made up of the Bengali-speaking people from West 
Bengal, and a third were Nepalese from neighbouring Nepal.52
At issue was a challenge to the registration of up to
200,000 people who were, some Assamese organizations 
insisted, "illegal aliens." There were demands that the 
names of these "foreigners" be stricken from the voter rolls 
for the forthcoming elections in January, 1980.53 Bengalis 
(from West Bengal), after calls were raised for 
disenfranchising those alleged to be aliens, felt threatened 
and quickly formed a group called the "Indian Citizens 
Rights Preservation Committee" in Assam.54
In response to this group, the country's election 
commission ordered that no name be struck from the voters 
rolls before the Parliamentary elections in January.55 This 
led to outcries from Assamese who claimed that the election 
could well be determined by votes of people who were not 
citizens and who might even be deported after the 
elections.56 Since over 40% of the 19 million people in
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Assam were Bengalis, and at least 5 million were illegal 
aliens, the Assamese now worried that through the electoral 
polls these Bengalis could win a large portion of seats in 
the state legislature and introduce numerous bills to suit 
their own needs and purposes. They felt this would be 
detrimental to their own interests.
As the election approached, violence against 
"foreigners" increased. On December 12, 1979, the Central 
Government in New Delhi instituted President's Rule in Assam 
making it's administration under the direct control of New 
Delhi.58
In December, 1979, the tension was further heightened 
by the exchange of fire in Belonia (North East) between 
India and Bangladesh.59 The dispute had occurred over a 44 
acre patch of paddy and sugarcane along the Mahuri river, 8 0 
miles south of Agartala, the capitol of Tripura.60 Farmers 
from the Indian side had been cultivating this land. That 
year, Bangladesh claimed rights to the property. Due to an 
exchange of fire, the Tripura government had ordered the 
raising of a protective embankment along Belonia and had 
charged that the government of "Bangladesh is up to some 
mischief and was deliberately trying to whip a minor dispute 
into an international situation.61 This hostility between 
the two countries helped to aggravate the tensions between 
the North Easterners and the Bangladeshi inhabitants of 
Assam.
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From January to April 1980, the situation was 
relatively calm, but in May, once again clashes between 
Assamese and Bengalis were reported. Five Bengalis were 
reportedly killed in fighting in the Tinsukia and Kamrup 
districts of upper Assam.62 A curfew had been imposed in 
the troubled areas where once again the Assamese demanded 
the expulsion of "illegal aliens," and the Indian Army had 
to patrol the important towns.63 The Assamese students had 
intensified their protests by starting a nine day non­
cooperation movement, which paralyzed work in Government 
offices, banks, and other public services. Picketing of oil 
installations continued, blocking the flow of oil through 
the pipeline leading from refineries outside, for the fifth 
consecutive month.64
The talks between the Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi and 
students were broken off when the students refused to accept 
a stipulation that only those "foreigners," mostly Bengali 
refugees from Bangladesh, who had entered the state since 
1971 would be identified and deported.65 The student 
leaders demanded that all those who had come since 1951 
should be identified and disenfranchised as a first step to 
their deportation or resettlement.66 Because the situation 
became so tense, authorities jailed many student leaders. 
Kumar Mahanta, President of the All Assam Student's Union, 
one of the few not jailed, said that the agitators were 
prepared for negotiations, provided the Indian Government
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stood by the Constitution and expelled illegal residents.67 
He claimed that millions of illegal immigrants from 
Bangladesh and Nepal enjoyed political rights in Assam and 
that more people were crossing the unchecked borders 
daily.68
By Tuesday, June 10, 1980, additional security forces 
had been flown into Tripura and Assam to contain the 
spreading violence. New Delhi had declared two districts of 
Tripura "disturbed areas" and ordered in Army and 
paramilitary forces. Mrs. Gandhi also hinted at a foreign 
influence, namely the C.I.A., being behind all this 
agitation.69
By this time, the inter-communal violence death-toll in
Assam was over 2000.70 There were reports from Bangladesh
that 7 00 bodies had been washed down by rivers from this
state.71 Shelter materials, food, and drugs were sent by
the Government of India to help more than 200,000 rendered
homeless.72 The irony of the Government's situation was not
lost on the Western Press:
"...In colonial days the sort of unrest now spreading in 
many parts of India would have been called 'native 
uprisings.' These days the Government officials speak of 
'cultural clashes' and 'the rising self-confidence of 
once shy tribal groups."78
In 1979-80 in Assam, Northeast India saw the worst 
massacres in India since the blood baths that had 
accompanied its partition almost 3 3 years earlier. More 
than 15,000 houses in two districts alone had been burned,
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the traffic had been crippled and supply trucks ran only in 
convoys as protection against hit-and-run raids by rebelling 
tribesmen who battled the Government security forces. In 
all, the Government arrested more than 1,500 persons in the 
state of Tripura during the month of June, 198 0. The 
strikes and picketing in Assam, which had started in the 
Fall of 1979 over the issue of who should be eligible to 
vote in the January 1980 national elections, had turned into 
India's largest mass demonstration since the "Quit India 
Movement" that ended with India gaining her independence 
from Great Britain in 1947.74
Violence spilled over from Assam to some of the other 
states and Union territories in domino fashion. In the 
state of Nagaland, an underground movement arose which 
called for a long war with the Indian authorities to gain 
"the liberation of Nagaland."75 In Mizoram, the Mizo 
Liberation Front claimed it assassinated 7 persons, 
including 4 soldiers in July, 1980. Unrest in Manipur had 
caused 10,000 persons to flee the state by the summer of 
1980. Things were so unsettled in the Northeast that the 
Indian Government refused foreign correspondents a visit to 
this area.
'It's like fishing,' explained one Senior Home 
Minister, when an attempt to use force against Assamese 
picketers failed. 'When the fish pulls, you have to let up 
on the line./76
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Hence, by July, 1980, Mrs. Gandhi's government was 
beginning to maintain a go-slow approach, trying to keep the 
peace and protect the minorities in the hope that the 
Northeast region would cool down enough so that it could 
deal with specific demands.77
In spite of the Government's efforts at conciliation, 
the dissenters continued their stern opposition. The All 
Assam Student Group, generally acclaimed the leader of the 
movement, on 9th July, 198 0 refused a new request by the 
Prime Minister to end the strike.78 The student leaders 
stated that the strike would continue until the Government 
presented a programme that would guarantee the separate 
identity of the Assamese people, and chided Indira Gandhi 
for failing to stop the "repressive measures" in the 
state.79 Northeast states wanted to preserve their separate 
cultural and ethnic identities against the encroachment of 
people they considered foreigners.
In August, 1980, hope of concluding the massive anti- 
Government unrest first emerged in Assam.80 In an agreement 
reached between the Government and student leaders in the 
state, demonstrations against the immigrants were ended.
This agreement followed a ceasefire in the 14-month civil 
war in neighbouring Mizoram. It appeared that the 
Government offered to deport all Bangladeshis who had 
entered Assam illegally since 1971, while conferring alien 
status without citizenship or the right to vote on those who
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entered the state before 1971. However, there was little 
the Government could do about the deportation of Bengalis 
who had migrated to Assam from elsewhere in India. Nor 
would it have been an easy diplomatic task persuading 
Bangladesh to take back people who had left that already 
over-populated country during the past ten years.
With the failure of the talks October 27, 1980 between 
the Indian and Bangladeshi Governments on this matter, once 
again the Assamese renewed their drive for expulsion of the 
immigrants.81
It was the view of Mrs. Gandhi's government that 
agreeing to meet the demands of the Assamese student leaders 
was impossible, since it would mean the uprooting of several 
thousand Bengalis who had long been settled in Assam and had 
no prospect of returning to their original homes.82 On 
November 2, 1980, the ten-month blockade of oil 
installations by demonstrators had reportedly come to an 
end. Troops arrested pickets at wells and started pumping 
oil to the refinery at Gauhati.
Finally, the violence abated and on December 6, 1980. 
One year of President's Rule ended when a new administration 
made up of eight members of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's 
Congress Party, took control of Assam's state government.83 
Anwara Taimor, a trusted leader of the Congress Party, was 
sworn in as Chief Minister, amid heavy security, and once 
again the revival of local government was instituted.84
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However, it was only in August of 1985 under the Prime 
Ministership of Rajiv Gandhi that a "peace deal" with the 
Assamese Chief Minister was signed and a measure of peace 
ensued.85
Under this new accord between the Prime Minister and 
the Assamese Chief Minister elections were to be held "soon" 
in Assam. The Central Government also bowed to the demands 
by Assamese protestors and declared that all immigrants who 
arrived in Assam after 1965 were to be disenfranchised. In 
addition, immigrants who had arrived after 1971 were to be 
deported.8^
This Assamese accord called for the then current state 
legislature, elected in the disputed voting of 198 3 to be 
dissolved. A caretaker government was to take control until 
after the new elections. Additionally, certain unspecified 
"legislative and administrative safeguards" were promised by 
the Central Government "to protect the cultural, social and 
linguistic identity and heritage" of the Assamese people.
The government also promised to intensify economic 
development of the region.87
Newspapers and politicians proclaimed that the Assam 
dispute had finally been "solved" by the accord.88 Mr. 
Gandhi was hailed as having brought an attitude that 
contrasted on the Assam issue with that of his predecessor 
and mother, P.M. Indira Gandhi. The Governor of Assam 
Bhishma Narain Singh praised Mr. Gandhi for his "wisdom and
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statesmanship."89
Thus we find under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi, 
years of disputes, violence and strife were resolved and a 
new understanding and attitude was reached between the 
Centre and Assam. Finally, the Central Government had taken 
the initiative and brought the North East's most troubled 
state back into its fold. The Centre, through Rajiv 
Gandhi's pragmatism and political manoeuvering had managed 
to resolve a decade of social, political and cultural 
antagonism, and had created a climate of hope, cooperation 
and empathy between Assam and the Centre.
Analysis of The Situation
The genesis and growth of this .regional outburst was 
the accumulation of aggravations over several problems.
These problems had been initiated by British policy in the 
northeast and were systematically ignored by the Indian 
Government after independence. Hence, decades of 
shouldering ill-feeling and consequent inaction in this 
region caused North Easterners to conclude that they had to 
take fate in to their own hands. They decided that recourse 
through violent means was the only answer to their plight.
The British policy of segregation, established by the 
drawing of the Inner Line, helped to isolate and alienate 
the hill people from the plainsmen. The only community 
allowed into this region by the authorities during the
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British rule had been the neighbouring Bengalis who had 
assumed all senior posts during the British administration 
of the region. Bengali chauvinism spread from language to 
attitudes and helped to alienate further the people in this 
"closed society."
After the declaration of independence in 1947, the 
government's attitude toward the northeast was similar to 
that of the British, in that they did not directly interfere 
or intervene in the region, but, on the other hand, they did 
nothing to prevent migration into the hills. Due to 
economic pressure on the land, mass migrations from 
neighbouring West Bengal, East Pakistan (later Bangladesh), 
and Nepal continued for three decades from 1947 70 1977.
The hillsmen found themselves swamped by people who not only 
spoke different languages, wore different garments, showed 
an ethnic diversity, and separate religious affiliations and 
belonged to a completely different culture, but also owned 
large portions of their land and controlled most of the top 
administrative positions in the state.
Some Assamese viewed their situation as similar to the
Palestinian problem.
"To those who are aware of Jewish travails in Europe, 
Israel's moral right to exist is unquestionable. But 
from the Palestinian point of view, Israel is only the 
result of a forcible take-over of their land by people 
who are backed by western money and arms."90
Behind the Assamese perception lies the peculiar 
history of the demographic transformation of a frontier area
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within a relatively short period of time and its enduring 
effects on the evolution of Assamese society. The census 
reveals that in 1971 Assam had a population of 15 million 
people, of which only 6.5 were a result of natural 
population growth among the ethnic Assamese.91 In effect, 
the other 8.5 million, i.e., the majority, were assumed to 
be migrants and their descendants.92 Hence, Baruah states 
that:
"Such a high level of migration does not easily lead to 
assimilation. The shear logic of numbers argues against 
harmony. It is difficult to imagine any situation where 
such a phenomenon would not cause social tensions and 
resentment."93
There were primitive rebellions against the influx in
the 19th century when the hill peoples raided tea gardens.
In the plains the protest against immigration began in the
1920s, leading to the British Inner Line permit systems.94
"National and sub-national upsurges are often forms of 
political intervention of the masses when institutional 
channels fail to articulate public grievances. Along 
with demographic changes, structural underdevelopment has 
been the inescapable fate of the frontiers..."95
"Stripped of all its abstractions, the Assamese fight 
for their cultural identity to maintain their majority 
status in Assam. It is against all historical logic to 
expect Assamese sub-nationalism to die out because the 
presence of 'foreigners' has become a fact of life, any 
more than Palestinian nationalism can be expected to end 
because Israel is a formidable reality."96
Baruah suggests that Assam's problems might require 
further reorganization of the state by "lopping off" Bengali 
speaking Cachan district and carving out a genuinely 
Assamese speaking majority state to avert a "permanent
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Northern Ireland type of conflict."97
Article 6(a) of the Indian Constitution explicitly 
recognizes the right to citizenship of a person if "he or 
either of his parents or grandparents was born in India as 
defined by the Government of India Act, 193 5.1,98 Hence, 
migration to India after July 19, 1948 was categorically 
permitted even by people who initially went to Pakistan.
The right to sanctuary and citizenship is not barred by time 
no matter when a person chooses to come back, they shall be 
deemed to have migrated to the territory of India after the 
19th of July, 1948.99
Clearly, the founding fathers of the Indian Republic 
would not have written these provisions if they had not felt 
in 1949 that population shifts were bound to occur.
Besides migration, the North Easterner's problems were 
a culmination of post-independent India's mood of rising 
expectations of growth and prosperity when the British had 
departed and which remained unfulfilled after 1974. Added 
to this was the government of India's systematic help 
extended in the educational sphere which aided the North 
Easterner's understanding of the political situation.
Hence, when the economic and political landscape appeared 
bleak, student leaders helped mobilize the once apathetic 
masses into a large scale civil disobedience movement 
against "foreigners."
Supplementing the problem was the Congress Party's
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dependence on minority votes.100 To counter Communist Party 
activities and neutralize it s influence, Tripura's Congress 
Party leaders assisted by transporting in refugees from 
Comilla (in Pakistan) and other districts.101 This gamble 
did not pay, but having acquiesced in these tactics, the 
Congress leaders were not in a position to oppose other 
groups which also found it profitable to connive at illicit 
immigration.
Jute and sugar cane growers looking for cheap labor 
were abetted by touts who provided an ever increasing supply 
of illegal manpower and "jungle passports."102
Adding to this predicament of clandestine operations 
along a 3,654 kilometre frontier was the attitude of both 
the Union and State governments (at New Delhi, Tripura and 
Calcutta) of turning a blind eye to these activities. 
Naturally , this attitude inspired the activities of 
agencies in India that found it rewarding to smuggle in 
manpower. Politicians, settlement officials, contractors, 
land owners, employers, policemen, and border guards were 
apparently "hand in glove" in a conspiracy that seriously 
disturbed the demographic balance and created many of the 
tensions that came to afflict the northeast.103
Herein lay the real danger of the 1980s. Naga 
insurgency, Metei chauvinism and the Mizo rebellion were 
worry enough without adding an "open-door policy."104 Not 
only did this alienate the original inhabitants but it also
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jeopardized the security of Bengalis who had lived in this 
region for generations.
Finally, we find that New Delhi's "peace deal" with the 
Assamese in 1985 brought in a measure of fresh hope for the 
North-East. This region, which has had sporadic outbursts 
of violence throughout the 1980s is in more control of its 
affairs and is willing to work within the constitutional 
framework of the Indian government. Rajiv Gandhi has 
managed to take charge of the situation and bring a 
recalcitrant region within New delhi's control through 
political compromise and a fresh understanding of India's 
problems.
Conclusion
The success of the measures undertaken by the 
Government of India, the language conflict, Bengali 
attitudes and the immigrant issue led to the problems in the 
Northeast. These problems were eventually resolved 
somewhat, in 1985, after years of violence.
This indifference and lack of swift action by the
central government in Northeast India did incalculable
damage to this region.
"It has caused high unemployment, tremendously increased 
land prices, denuded forests, and led to the 
appropriation of Khas Mahal estates. In human terms it 
has boosted smuggling, provided muscle for extremist 
politics, fomented racial antagonism, and made evasion of 
the law a way of life in the border marshes."105
However, in spite of the violence and continuing
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grievances, the Government of India in 1985 managed to sign 
an accord with the Assamese government which finally 
promoted a measure of peace in this region. Due to Rajiv 
Gandhi's political acumen, peaceful measures were adopted 
and the process of political resolution began to be realized 
as a viable alternative after years of violence and 
conflict. Thus Assam was to be controlled by the Assamese 
who would voice their feelings and concerns by selecting the 
candidates of their choice in the new elections.
Thus we find that New Delhi's leadership was the 
crucial element in the Assamese case. When Mrs. Gandhi 
manipulated the situation conditions became worse. However, 
when the central leadership in Delhi addressed the problems 
in their own terms the case could be resolved.
#######
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CHAPTER 3
PUNJAB
History of the Sikhs
The Second case study undertaken describes regionalism 
in the Punjab. The chapter begins with a brief history of 
the Punjab, linked with the birth and growth of Sikhism, 
Punjab's dominant religion. It proceeds to explain some of 
the major causes of violence in the region from 1981 through 
1984. Finally, there is an analysis of the regionalism in 
Punjab, followed by a short conclusion.
The name Punjab is derived from two Persian words, punj 
(five) and ab (water), meaning five waters or rivers.1
From the Presidential address read at the first annual 
meeting of the Punjab Historical Society (December 27,
1910), it was noted that:
"There are few places in the world, and certainly very 
few on the continent of Asia, which present a more 
entrancing field for historical research than the 
Province of the Punjab. It has from the beginning of 
time, been the scene of more changes, more movement, than 
any part of India..."2
Historically, this province was the traditional home of 
those whose lives colored the Vedic scriptures, and 
contained the site of the battlefield of the 
Mahabharata.3
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Alexander and his army invaded India in 326 B.C. and 
left traces of Greek civilization throughout the region, but 
after their withdrawal all archeological evidence attested 
to the supremacy of Buddhism in the Punjab.4 Following the 
collapse of the great Hindu empires and with the arrival of 
the Muslim Era, in the 13th century A.D. Punjab reached the 
acme of its historic importance and lapsed "into something 
very like a settled government."5
The founder of the Sikh faith, Guru Nanak, a Hindu 
Kshatriya (or warrior caste), was born in 1469 A.D. in the 
village of Tolwandi Rai Bhoi, now called Nankara Sahib.6 He 
was not an ascetic recluse, unlike most Indian religious 
leaders. To Nanak, religion was not limited to symbols, 
rituals, and scriptures, but was embedded in everyday life:
" Religion does not consist in a patched coat, a 
Yogi's staff, or in ashes smeared on the body. Religion 
does not consist in mere words; he who looks on all men 
as equals is religious. Religion does not consist in 
wandering to tombs or places of cremation, or sitting in 
postures of contemplation... Abide pure among the 
impurities of the world, thus shalt thou find the way of 
religion."7
Guru Nanak's ministry was that of education and 
enlightenment. It was reserved for his successors to 
amplify and translate his teachings into practice, an 
evolutionary process in the context of which succeeding 
gurus merged their personalities into that of their 
founder.8
These gurus strengthened the unifying institutions, 
popularized the punjabi script calling it Gurumukhi,
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opposed the practice of purdah (veiling), led a vigorous 
campaign against sati, (widow self-sacrifice), composed the 
Granth Sahib, and constructed a central place of worship, 
the Golden Temple at Amritsar.9 Unfortunately, due to 
Mughal religious intolerance and bigotry, the Sikhs turned 
to arms as a means of "protection to the poor and 
destruction to the tyrant.10
After the execution of Arjun (the 5th Guru) in 1606 
A.D. by the Mughals, the Sikhs slowly began to evolve from a 
pacifist to a militant people. The final transformation 
came in 1699, when Guru Govind Singh organized his followers 
into members of a fighting fraternity or Khalsa (meaning the 
pure), through baptism, and enjoined them to wear the five 
common symbols of the new order: Kesh (hair), Kangha (comb), 
Kara (bangle), Kachha (underwear), and Kirpan (dagger).11 
Thus Guru Govind Singh had not taken to military ways for 
any political aggrandizement, but as a matter of self- 
defense.
During the 1850s under British rule the Punjab soon 
began to prosper. Old canals were re-opened and new ones 
created. Extensive roads were built together with the 
railway, postal, and telegraphic communications network in 
the region.12 Thus, it is not surprising that when most of 
north and east India revolted against the British in 1857, 
Punjab, which had initially faced the Mughal onslaught 
against its people, remained loyal to the British.
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Naturally, the British rewarded the Punjabis (mostly 
Sikhs) for their non-involvement in regional politics, by 
classifying them a "martial race" and allotting them more 
than proportional representation in the military.13 This 
naturally irked other Indian communities not so generously 
endowed with British favor, who soon began to resent Sikh 
privileges. Other Punjabi Hindu families for economic 
reasons, often brought up their first born male as a Sikh to 
accrue benefits and favors with the British.
Looking at the situation from a different perspective, 
however, Khushwant Singh, argues that the Sikhs were taken 
advantage of by both the British and later on the Indian 
government. He stated that within a few years of the 
passing of Guru Govind Singh, Hindu ceremonies and rituals 
crept back into the Sikh Gurudwaras (temples), creating 
tension between the two communities by the threat of 
absorption of the Sikhs into the Hindu fold.14
Sikh Gurudwaras, besides being places of worship were 
also used as congregational centers, for socio-religious 
activities, transmission of knowledge, and rest houses for 
travellers.15 They were well endowed and not only had 
revenues of large tracts of land attached to them, but also 
accumulated enormous incomes through individual and 
institutional offerings.16 Unfortunately, Sikh power and 
prestige fell into the hands of Hindu priests who not only 
controlled the ecclesiastical property but, over time, made
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their positions hereditary, and also introduced worship of 
Hindu idols and reverence towards their customs. Thus, from 
Singh's point of view, it was only natural for the Sikhs to 
want the management and control of their shrines returned 
into their own hands.
Finally, the Sikh community provided loyalty and whole­
hearted support for the British during the First World War, 
but their efforts went unrewarded politically, especially 
compared to British treatment, during the same period, of 
the Muslims.17 When the war ended, the Sikhs expected to be 
compensated for their services.
"The community, which had done so much more than any 
other in the war, which paid 4 0 percent of the land 
revenue of the province and formed 25 percent of the 
electorate, was treated with less consideration than... 
the Muslims (who with a population of 10 percent in 
Bihar), were given 3 3 percent representation.1,18
In 1919, at Jallianwalla Bagh, General Dyer lined up 
his troops and fired on an unlawful but peaceful crowd, 
unarmed civilians, many women and children, killing and 
wounding over 1,500 people: this massacre, together with 
British support of the Hindu priests concerning the temples, 
finally caused 30,000 Sikhs to be jailed, 400 killed, and
2,000 wounded over a five year period. The result was a 
permanent wedge driven between the British and the Sikhs.19
The toll of the partition of the India in 1947 was the 
heaviest for the Sikhs. Nearly 2 percent of their 
population was massacred during the riots and their economic
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losses were incalculable.20
According to Maharaja Yadvindra Singh of Patiala:
"There was such a clamor among Hindus and Sikhs of the 
Northwest to reach Patiala- to escape despoliation and 
torture. They came in swarms. They came jampacked in 
trains, huddled on rooftops, standing on footboards, 
clutching onto handlebars.... A human tragedy on a vast 
scale. The word "refugee" suddenly acquired such 
reality- such poignancy.21
After the partition the new province of Punjab retained 
control of only 13 out of 29 districts of undivided 
Punjab.22 All of the Muslim majority districts were 
transferred to Pakistan and the non-Muslim majority 
districts remained in India. The new Punjab inherited only 
3 4 percent of the area with 47 percent of the population of 
what had been Punjab.22
As a result of the reorganization of India on a 
linguistic basis, PEPSU (Patiala and East Punjab States 
Union) was merged with Punjab on November 1, 1956. The 
Sikhs formed about one third of the state's population and 
were concentrated in the western districts, whereas the hill 
areas of East Punjab were organized into a new Union 
Territory and called Himachal Pradesh.24 Punjabi and Hindi 
were both official languages of the Punjab. However, with 
the persistent demand of a unilingual Punjabi speaking 
state, the government of India announced in 1966 that the 
Punjab would be divided into two units, Punjabi Suba (Punjab 
speaking) and Haryana, corresponding to the regions of 
language dominance. The Sikhs now constituted a majority in
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the Punjab, fifty-five percent of the population.
Thus we find that the Punjab, an area invaded by all 
conquerors from northwest India evolved into a form of 
settled government under the Muslim era and won favor, for a 
time, under the British, only to be torn by the chaos of the 
partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan in 
1947. The Sikh religion which emerged in this region only 
attained a majority status in independent India after 
November 1, 1966. Hence, cultural, linguistic and a sense 
of religious identity was fostered in this region from the 
mid 1960s.
Causes of the Violence
The causes of the spread of disenchantment against the 
government of India by the Sikhs can be traced to partition 
and the coming of independence in 1947, and was the 
accumulation of numerous grievances, religious fanaticism 
and political blundering.
In colonial India, Sikh communal representation in the 
political bodies had been guaranteed through the 
establishment of separate communal electorates and the 
reservation of seats on a communal basis. This formula had 
ensured a degree of Sikh communal representation but it had 
also served as a form of identity reaffirmation for the 
Sikhs. However, in a free India committed to secularism, 
separate communal political representation was abolished.25 
Hence,the abolition of separate electorates and introduction
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of joint electorates made the Sikhs a minority in Punjab 
subservient to the Hindus, thereby increasing their 
agitation for a separate state.26
Moreover, in secular India, minority benefits enjoyed 
by this community earlier specially in the army, were 
abrogated. Thus people who observed Sikh forms and symbols 
for economic benefits gave them up.27
As a consequence of the partition, nearly 2.5 million 
Sikhs, most of whom were prosperous, had to leave their 
former homes and flee to India, resulting in a substantial 
increase in the number of Sikhs in certain contiguous 
regions. The economically disgruntled refugees in certain 
compact areas gave birth to the idea of an autonomous Sikh 
state.28
The "Green Revolution" was promulgated in Punjab during 
the mid-sixties (1965-66) with the use of the high yielding 
Mexican wheat seeds. The new technology was so effective 
that it enabled Punjab, once a deficit state, which produced 
3.39 million tonnes of food grain in 1966, to become a major 
surplus producer in 197 6-77 when it's output exceeded 9.21 
million tonnes of grain.29
Further, during the 1960s the prosperity of the Green 
Revolution brought with it, another set of problems.
Migrant laborers from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar came in the 
thousands to Punjab as farmhands, many eventually settled 
here and enrolled on the voter lists, thus increasing the
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agitation of the Sikhs who felt swamped in by the Hindus.30
The Shiromani Akali Dal was formed on December 14, 1920 
during the days of the Gurudwara Reform Movement with 
headquarters in the Golden Temple, at Amritsar. However, 
the Akali Dal emerged as a full-fledged political party in 
the Punjab during the 193 6-37 elections held under the 
Government of India Act of 193 5.31 To the present day we 
find an Akali movement which had previously directed its 
actions against the Mahants (Hindu priests) controlling the 
Sikh gurudwaras , vying for control of the Shiromani 
Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (S.G.P.C., which controlled 
the Gurudwaras).32 This Akali movement was of a social and 
religious nature in origin, one aimed at winning control of 
the S.G.P.C. and its vast resources. With such resources, 
it could help finance its candidates to the Akali Dal Party.
Virtually since its inception, factionalism and 
splinter groups developed so that the Akali Dal was seldom, 
if ever, a monolithic party able to command either the 
complete allegiance of its followers, or to speak for the 
entire Sikh community. Nonetheless, it consistently 
dominates the S.G.P.C. within this competitive context.33
During the 19 3 0s the Akali Dal was divided into Master 
Tara Singh's group, Baba Kharak Singh's group and Gyani Sher 
Singh's group.34 However, following independence and 
through the 1950s, Master Tara Singh and his faction within 
the Akali Dal dominated with continual challenges from the
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Malwa Akali Dal. The Sadh Sangat Board (Congress Sikhs), 
and the Desh Bhagat (Communist Sikhs). The individuals 
involved subsequently changed, but the basic patterns of 
internally contending groups continues.35
From the start of independence the Akali leader Master 
Tara Singh decided that the only way to prevent modernism 
and Hinduism from drowning the Sikhs' identity was to demand 
official recognition as a separate community. Hindu and 
Sikh refugees from West Punjab (i.e. Pakistan) had to fight 
to re-establish themselves in the truncated Indian Punjab, 
and their struggle aroused communal prejudices. But the 
Akalis' claim that Sikhism was in danger received its 
greatest boost from the movement for a Punjabi-speaking 
state or Punjab Suba.36 Punjabi Hindus claimed that the 
demand was communal.
The three main languages of the undivided Punjab (pre- 
1947) had been Urdu, Hindu and various forms of Punjabi. Of 
the three, Punjabi was the most widely spoken. The Akalis 
argued that the state's language should be Punjabi written 
in the Gurumukhi script which was not widely used outside 
the Sikh religion institutions. Because of the Punjabi Suba 
Movement and the link between language and communalism, in 
the 1961 census many Punjabi speaking Hindus declared Hindu 
as their mother tongue.37
After the election results from the 1947-1962 period in 
the 1952 elections the Akali Dal had merged with the
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Congress party and 2 6 of its nominees ran on the Congress 
ticket.38 Hence, out of the 186 seats contested, the 
Congress party won 122 and the Akali Dal 3 3 seats.
In the 1957 electoral race, the Akali Dal did not 
officially contest the elections and the Congress party held 
onto 12 0 out of the 154 seats.
However, by the 1962 general elections in the Punjab, 
the Akali Dal entered as an "independent political party" 
and declared "war" against the Congress party over the 
Punjabi Suba issue.39 Out of a total of 154 seats, the 
Congress party won 90 and the Akali Dal 19 in this 
election.40
When observing the electoral results of Punjab, we must 
also note that the nature of the problem should indicate 
changing territorial configurations.
After independence in 1947, a new state of PEPSU 
(Punjab and East Patiala States Union) was created in 
addition to a much smaller sized Punjab (with the Muslim 
majority portion going to Pakistan). In 1956 after numerous 
demonstrations organized by the Akali Dal, PEPSU was merged 
with Punjab, but the overwhelming Hindu province of Himachal 
Pradesh was retained as a separate entity. In the new 
Punjab, a limited measure of internal autonomy was to be 
given to two communities of the provincial legislature 
representing the Punjabi and Hindu speaking regions.41
After its enormous victory in the 1959 S.G.P.C.
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elections, the Akali leaders once again interpreted their 
victory as a mandate to begin their agitation for a Punjabi 
Suba.42
Prime Minister Nehru remained adamantly opposed to the 
Punjabi Suba until his death in 1964, but in 1966 his 
daughter Indira Gandhi agreed to the formation of a Punjabi­
speaking state. The Punjabi Suba proved a hollow victory 
for the Akalis because the Sikh vote was split between the 
Congress and Akalis. The only way they could form a 
government was in alliance with the Hindu Jan Sangh party.43 
The Congress party, with its cross-communal following, had 
always had enough Sikhs in positions of leadership to make 
it a powerful contender for electoral support from Sikhs. 
Thus in the five elections to the Punjab legislative 
assembly held between 1967 and 1980, the Congress party was 
able to command support from a significant body of Sikh 
voters, and as a result the Akali Dal was unable to get more 
30 percent of the total vote.44
From the establishment of the Punjabi Suba in 1966, to 
1980, the Akali Dal was able to govern the Punjab only with 
the assistance of a coalition government, and at the same 
time they had to contend with the Congress party's support 
from Sikh voters in the Punjab. In the mid-term election of 
1969, the Akali Dal was again able to form a government with 
the assistance of the Jan Sangh.45
However, in the next election of the Punjab assembly in
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1972, the Akali Dal was ousted from power by the Congress 
party. Following the Congress party's historic defeat 
after the imposition of the Emergency in 1977, the Akali Dal 
again formed a government in the Punjab through an alliance 
with the Janata party. After the Congress party resumed 
power in the center in 1980, it called fresh elections to 
provincial assemblies and won 54 percent of the seats in the 
Punjab legislature.46
The Akali party also viewed the massive influx of non- 
Sikhs with alarm, because its chief instruments in getting 
the Suba (district) was lost, when the Congress Government 
more often than not, won at the polls.47
In April 1973, the Akalis passed the controversial 
Anandpur Sahib Resolution in which the Sikhs were described 
as a separate nation. They also demanded greater autonomy 
for the state, readjustment of its boundaries including many 
Punjabi speaking areas of Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, and 
Raj isthan.48
Another issue of contention was that many Sikhs began 
to feel that too much of their river water was being 
parceled out to other states such as Haryana and Himachal 
Pradesh.49
The city of Chandigarh also became an issue of 
contention. After Partition in 1947, Prime Minister 
Jawaharhal Nehru, had decided that Amristar was too close to 
the Pakistan border to be the capital of Punjab. Therefore
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a new capital city of Chandigarh was built. When the state 
was divided along linguistic lines in 1966, into Punjab and 
Haryana, Chandigarh served as the capital of both, and 
housed the state assemblies and the secretariats of both 
Punjab and Haryana.50
However, by the mid 1970s the Sikhs increased their 
demands that the city of Chandigarh become Punjab's 
exclusive capital.51
The Akali's wanted control of the country's Sikh 
temples, or Gurudwaras, to come under a single authority. 
They felt that the income which these Gurudwaras attracted, 
(about 100 million pounds a year), would help finance the 
Akali movement, and would also aid the increased 
concentration power in one governing body.52
Sikhs called for the broadcast of their hymns over the 
radio, and the ban on sale of meat, alcohol, and tobacco 
around the vicinity of the Golden Temple.53
Finally, they wanted to be allowed to board airliners 
with their nine inch Kirpans, the daggers they wore 
according to their religious custom.54 In 1982 on August 
4th and 20th two attempted hijackings of Indian Airline 
planes were carried out by Sikh extremists, after which 
carrying Kirpans (daggers) on board all Indian Airline 
planes was prohibited.
Mrs. Gandhi herself contributed in some ways to the 
radical wing of the Akali Dal. In 1972 the Congress party
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ousted the Akali Dal from power in the Punjab, but after its 
electoral defeat in 1977 it decidedly changed its course of 
action.
Zail Singh, who had been chief minister of Punjab 
during the 1972-77 years, advised Sanjay Gandhi (Mrs. 
Gandhi's son) to try to break the back of the Akali Dal.55
In the late 197 0s the Akali Dal was dominated by three 
men - Prakesh Singh Badal (who had succeeded Zail Singh as 
Chief Minister, Harchand Singh Longowal, a religious teacher 
who had led the agitation against the Emergency, and 
Gurucharan Singh Tahra, a politician with communist 
connections who headed the S.G.P.C. Zail Singh knew that 
displacing one of the Akali trinity would only lead to a 
stronger alliance of the other two. Hence, he recommended 
that a new religious leader be brought into the picture to 
discredit the traditional Akali Dal leadership. The choice 
eventually fell on Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, who as head 
of the Damdani Taksal (an influential Sikh school) had a 
ready made status in the Sikh community.56
As a rigid fundamentalist, Bhindranwale could 
capitalize on the compromises with Sikh interests that the 
Akali Dal were bound to make to stay in power. However, he 
needed an issue, a cause to rally behind and both Sanjay and 
Zail Singh found this in the Nirankaris (a heretical sect of 
Sikhs who are very influential in the Punjabi trading 
community). They also needed a party to promote
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Bhindranwale and harass the Akalis. On April 13, 1978, a 
new party called the Dal Khalsa (the party of the pure) was 
formed. Bhindranwale was never openly associated with the 
Dal Khalsa, and until his death maintained that he was a 
"man of religion, not a politician."57
When Mrs. Gandhi returned to power in 1980 she 
continued to support Bhindranwale until he became involved 
with the murders of Baba Gurbachan Singh (the leader of the 
Nirankari sect), Lala Jagat Narain (the proprietor of a 
chain of newspapers) and Santokh Singh (a rival Sikh 
politician).58
Darbara Singh, the Congress Chief Minister of Punjab 
had insisted that Bhindranwale be arrested, but the central 
government feared there would be violence because of the 
larger number of Sikhs who had gathered to protect him.
On September 20, 1981, after the second murder, 
Bhindranwale surrendered to the police. On October 14,
1981, less than a month after his arrest, Zail Singh told 
parliament that there was no evidence that Bhindranwale was 
involved in the murders , and the decision to
release Bhindranwale was taken by government.59
However, after the third slaying, Bhindranwale had 
fallen out with the Congress and a new bidder for his 
support had entered the ring, the Akali Dal.60 It was after 
this stage that the Akali Dal slowly grouped into two 
sections —  the more radical one followed Bhindranwale and
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the moderate elements swore their allegiances to Longowal, 
the President of the Akali Dal.61
During the imposition of the Emergency (declared on 
June 26, 1975), when Mrs. Gandhi had suspended all 
constitutional rights of individuals, most Akali agitators 
were jailed, and naturally during the rival Janata rule (the 
only political party to defeat the Congress party since 
independence) were resurrected to high offices in their 
state.62 Unfortunately, Janata power dissolved within a 
couple of years and in the 198 0 elections, the Congress 
Party routed the Akali-Janata combination in Punjab.63 
Akalis now out of power and with small prospects of 
regaining it through the electoral process, decided to 
destabilize the Congress Government through agitation.64
They pointed to the 197 3 Anandpur Resolution out and 
proclaimed it as a charter of Sikh demands, however, tagging 
along another 45 additional demands. The Anandpur Sahib 
Resolution demanded a readjustment of state boundaries to 
include in Punjab the Punjabi speaking areas of neighboring 
Haryana, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh. Now they also 
wanted Chandigrah to be the exclusive capitol of Punjab, a 
fairer allocation of river water to Punjab and referred 
vaguely to a separate "Sikh nation."65 They followed this 
up with a series of agitations such as Nahar Roko (blocking 
the canals), Rasta Roko (blocking road traffic), Kam roko 
(stopping work), and finally declared a Dharma Yudh
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(righteous war) from Amristar against the central government 
by sending over 1,000 volunteers a day to court arrest.66
Alongside this passive resistance movement, a parallel 
terrorist one began to develop under the leadership of 
Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.67
On May 23, 1981, The London Times reported that "there
is a rumble at present being felt from a small minority of 
people who have reactivated old separatist sentiments and 
are calling for a Sikh homeland to be called Khalistan."68 
The publication astutely warned that most Sikhs did not 
support the idea of a separate homeland, but a mishandling 
of the situation could drive the moderates over to the 
extremist cause.69
Unfortunately, events moved rather quickly from this 
point and the daily exchange between the Sikhs, Nirankaris, 
and Hindus only worsened relations. On September 22nd, 
twelve days after the murder of an 82 year old newspaper 
editor who had written critically of resurgent Sikh 
separation, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale was arrested.70 Yet 
it was not clear that he was at the forefront of the Sikh 
secessionist campaign, which was led by a few young 
university graduates.71 Nevertheless, these extremists were 
opposed to the moderates of the Akali Party headed by 
Harchand Singh Longowal.72
On September 29, 1981, becoming bolder, Sikh militants 
hijacked an Indian Airlines plane carrying 111 passengers in
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Amristar.73 The Dal Khalsa (militant faction of the Akali 
Dal) claimed responsibility for this hijacking and demanded 
the release of Sikh militants from Indian jails.74 
Immediately following the hijacking, the police crackdown in 
Punjab led to the arrest of more than 70 people.75 
Unfortunately the violence continued to increase throughout 
the months. Trouble spread to 2 0 Punjabi towns, Mrs. Gandhi 
belatedly elected a "crisis committee" to handle the 
situation.76
On August 5th and 21st, 1982, two further attempts at 
hijacking an Indian Airlines plane were made.77 Mrs.
Gandhi, trying the course of appeasement, ordered Darbara 
Singh, the Chief Minister of Punjab to release 3 0,000 Sikh 
prisoners. Matters only went downhill when a clash between 
those released and the police ensued in Kapurthala.78
To bring a halt to the violence, Mrs. Gandhi's Indian 
government appealed for negotiations, stating "it is only 
through negotiations and a cordial atmosphere that issues 
can be resolved."79 The Akalis rejected the government's 
appeals and announced the launching of a Sikh Holy War on 
November 4, 1982.80 Mrs. Gandhi now began to fear a 
backlash from Haryana, which shared the common capital of 
Chandigarh with Punjab.81 Mrs. Gandhi still tried to 
appease the Sikhs and allowed them to carry their Kirpans on 
board aircraft.83 Sikh leaders, now still bolder, called 
this an "eyewash" and continued to encourage militants to
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court arrest. On April 25, 198 3, Sikh extremists shot and 
killed Mr. Avtar Singh Atwal, a Deputy Inspector General of 
Police in Amristar. Mr. Atwal was on the extremists' hit- 
list because he was conducting inguiries into various acts 
of violence by Sikh militants.83
President's Rule was imposed on October 6, 198 3. 
Violence once again erupted in this state.84 As clashes 
between Hindus and Sikhs escalated, the government moved in 
paramilitary forces to try and curtail the bloodshed.85 The 
government also banned the use of motorcycles which had 
become the terrorists principal means of communication and 
escape.86
In April 1984, a brief respite between the government
of India and the agitators was announced. The government
announced the amendment of Article 2 5 of the Indian
Constitution. The constitution stated:
"The reference to Hindus shall be construed as including 
a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or 
Buddhist religion..."
Sikhs objected to being grouped with Hindus. The 
government acknowledged that a re-wording of Article 2 5 to 
identify Sikhs as a separate group was going to be made. In 
return the Akali Dal leaders would call off the week long 
agitation planned.87
Unfortunately, violence by extremists was not curbed, 
and on April 5, 1984 New Delhi introduced stringent measures 
of detention without trial.88 Following Sikh attacks on
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Hindus in Punjab, Hindus in Haryana began reacting violently 
to having Sikhs in their midst.89
Violence also spread between the Bhindranwale 
(extremists) and Longowal (moderate) camps, and the Indian 
government was beginning to take seriously the allegations 
that Pakistan was involved with Sikh guerrillas.90 
Newspapers also claimed that some Pakistanis dressed as 
Sikhs were found in India among the Sikh warrior class, the 
Nihangs. A number of arrested Nihangs were found to have 
been circumcised, a ritual conducted only by Muslims, not 
Sikhs or Hindus on the Indian subcontinent.91
On April 15, 1984, Sikh terrorists conducted a well 
coordinated attack in which more than thirty railway 
stations were set on fire. The aim of the attacks, 
according to the United News of India, was to disrupt 
transport in the troubled state.92
A week later, on April 23, 1984, fifteen Sikh youths 
rode through the city of Amarkot and opened fire upon 
turbanless Hindus and Hindu shops. After a few stunning 
moments the bolder Hindus seized guns "and began loosing off 
a few blasts of their own."93 Three Hindus were killed and 
ten were badly injured.
The Golden Temple of Amritsar, the Holy Shrine of 
Sikhism, was first turned into an armed camp and later into 
a battleground by the warring Sikh factions led by Sant 
Harchand Singh Longowal and Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.
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Longowal, the leader of the official agitation to gain Sikh 
demands insisted that the campaign was not anti-Hindu. "Our 
demands are Punjabi demands, not simply Sikh demands."94
Bhindranwale, on the other hand, made no such 
concessions. He wanted to make right earlier wrongs 
committed by "Hindu imperialism" against the Sikhs. He had 
been quoted as saying, if every Sikh killed thirty-five 
Hindus then Khalistan would automatically appear.95
In May of 1984, the crisis of Punjabi regionalism 
reached new proportions. On May 8, 1984, Sikh rebels 
assassinated a village leader in Punjab's Ferozepur 
district. Followers of the two main Sikh factions exchanged 
gunfire inside a shrine in the Kapurthala district of 
Punjab. When Indian troops clashed with the extremists in 
the area, eight people were killed and sixteen extremists 
were arrested.96 On May 12, 1984, Sikh extremists shot and 
killed a newspaper editor Ramesh Chander in Jullunder,
Punjab (two years earlier, they had shot his father Jagat 
Narain). Mr. Chander was the third editor killed in Punjab 
in 1984.9  ^ Bhindranwale had been accused of complicity in 
the murder of Jagat Narain and was released only after riots 
in which twenty-one people died, and the central government 
intervened.96 On May 24, Longowal threatened a Mahatma 
Gandhi style "non-cooperation movement" against the 
government.99 Thus, when violence escalated and no other 
solution seemed appropriate or adequate, the Indian
90
government decided to launch "Operation Blue Star."100
It was common knowledge that all kinds of weapons and 
armaments used to kill their opponents were hidden by the 
extremists in the Golden Temple.101 India Today suggested 
that no decision could have been more painful to Mrs. Gandhi 
and her advisors than "Operation Blue Star— the biggest and 
most significant counter-terrorist action undertaken 
anywhere in the world."102 The consequences shocked the 
world.
On June 1, 1984, a curfew was clamped on the Holy 
City.103 Within 24 hours nearly 70,000 troops called from 
the army and paramilitary forces had taken up predetermined 
positions, to prevent any further terrorists from entering 
the temple and to keep away the mobs.104 However, at least 
ten people were killed and twenty-five injured in a seven- 
hour gun battle between Indian security forces and militant 
Sikhs in Amristar.
On June 2, 1984, Mrs. Gandhi went on the air in a T.V. 
broadcast declaring that the government would put down 
terrorism.105 June 3, 1984, saw the entire state "tightly 
secured" with the Indian troops operating on the 
psychological level of flushing out, rather than resorting 
to a full-fledged military operation.106 Quick to respond, 
the extremists made their intentions clear by lobbing 
grenades at the Indian Army outside the Golden Temple and 
maintaining a heavy fusillade with medium machine guns.107
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On June 4th, it was clear to the General Officer commanding 
the army that they faced a determined insurgent army charged 
with religious fervour, and not an armed rabble as had 
previously been thought.108
On June 5, 1984, the siege had been laid for 60 
hours.109 Ideally it would have been more useful to 
continue the siege, due to the growing mob violence outside 
Amritsar an officer leading the operations noted: to defend 
the Temple, something drastic would have had to ensue to 
prevent a dozen Jallianwalla Baghs around Amritsar.110 "It 
was all very nice to talk of effective, determined fire, but 
there is a limit to how many people you can kill out of a 
mob."111 It was this that prompted the generals to choose 
what one of them later called the devil's alternative: the 
storming of the Temple complex.
By dusk of June 5th "every inch of the temple was 
covered with machine gun fire from the radicals within the 
temple. It was utterly frustrating for the soldiers who saw 
their comrades die under fire from the temple and yet could 
not shoot back.112 Since Bhindranwale and his key 
lieutenants had decided to fight the last battle from the 
Akal Takht, it was decided to overcome the Akal Takht 
defense by using artillery fire and cannons to bring down 
the outer facade, pillars and canopy of the building.113 
The Indian Army soon overran the machine gun positions and 
as Bhindranwale tried to take cover, he was killed in a
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burst of gun fire.114
India Today in its long term analysis stated that with 
the death of Bhindranwale and his key lieutenants, the back 
of the present extremist movement had been broken.115 
Without a charismatic leader to inspire them, the remaining 
extremists hiding in the country side would have little 
scope for major mischief, according to the respected 
magazine. But the danger lay on two different fronts.
First, the weapons found in the Golden Temple clearly 
indicated the involvement of both the Chinese and the 
Pakistanis. Hence, India had to be cautious about foreign 
intervention in her domestic matters. Second, many Punjabis 
felt that notwithstanding all the problems the Sikh 
terrorists had caused, the Indian army's violation of the 
Golden Temple was not justified. They felt that the "Sikh 
community had been given a tight slap across the face," an 
action which could lead to a solidly alienated Sikh sub­
nationality, giving fillip to the Khalistan demand.116
Even the London Times, on June 9, 1984 headlined 
"Amristar- Gandhi's Falkland Factor?," and suggested that 
the "swift, clean, surgical operation" was bound to have its 
effect in terms of the voter turnout.117 In the view of the 
Times. on the other hand, Mrs. Gandhi's action represented a 
major blow against communalism, regionalism and 
secessionism, and in favor of secularism and the maintenance 
of India's unity.
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Hence, no one anticipated what took place, least of all 
Mrs. Gandhi or her advisors. On October 31, 1984 the Indian 
Prime Minister was assassinated by two of her Sikh security 
guards.118 The entire nation received the news with shock 
and disbelief. Many felt that "...Certain forces were now 
active to destroy the democratic system by indulging in 
individual terrorism and violence... and that the whole 
country would fight against the anti-national and anti­
democratic forces."119
In reaction to her death, overjoyed Sikhs danced, sang, 
and set off fireworks in London.120 However, irate mobs of 
Hindus took to the streets in many of the major cities in 
India attacking private and public vehicles, and setting 
them on fire.121 In West Bengal the help of the army was 
sought to aid the civil authorities in curtailing mob 
violence against Sikhs.122
Rajiv, Indira Gandhi's eldest son, was sworn in as 
Prime Minister immediately. He appealed to the people for 
calm and an exercise of "maximum restraint" in this moment 
of profound grief.123
The London Times suggested that the assassination could 
lead to the collapse of Indian unity. The cult of the 
mother was widely prevalent in India they argued, and 
reminded readers of the late Prime Minister's campaign 
slogan: "Indira is India: India is Indira."124 Could anyone 
hold together the infinitely fissiparous parts of the Indian
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union as she did? Could anyone provide the leadership that 
compared with hers? Was anyone else capable of governing 
India? Did the murder of Mrs. Gandhi mark "both the passing 
of an extraordinary leader and the beginning of a dangerous 
political passage for the world's largest democracy, 
enquired j ournalist."125
"Rajiv Gandhi's first task," stated the Philadelphia 
Enquirer, "will be to demonstrate whether he can extend the 
healing hand his mother often spoke of to calm Hindu-Sikh 
tensions."126 Fortunately, Rajiv Gandhi proved to be up to 
the task. In July, 1985, he had managed to persuade several 
Sikh leaders to come to New Delhi for talks.127
Although radical Sikhs denounced the settlement, the 
accord which resulted from these talks went a long way 
toward meeting several of the Sikhs' demands. The 
government's main concession concerned the city of 
Chandigarh, which had served as the common capital for both 
Punjab and Haryana since 19 66. Chandigarh would now become 
part of Punjab and serve as its capital alone. A new 
capital would be built for Haryana and a tribunal would 
select Hindi speaking areas in Punjab that would be 
incorporated into Haryana. The change would virtually 
ensure "that Sikhs will enjoy more political and economic 
power in Punjab..."128
The government also agreed to pay compensation to the 
families for all those killed in Sikh related disturbances
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since August 1982.129 Rajiv Gandhi also promised to 
"withdraw" the Armed Forces Special Powers Act in Punjab, 
which permitted search and arrest without warrant. Another 
long standing Sikh grievance - the demand for a greater 
share of river waters for irrigation was submitted to a 
tribunal which was to deliver its report within six 
months.130
Another major Akali Dal gain was the government's 
agreement to consider a national law to regulate the 
function of the thousands of Sikh shrines, scattered around 
the country. Hence, we find that the Sikhs gained far more 
than they gave up, under P.M. Rajiv Gandhi.131
Rajiv moved to placate Sikh bitterness fed by the 
Golden Temple raid and the violence against the Sikhs by 
Hindus outraged by his mother's assasination. Approval of 
this accord marked a major breakthrough in an effort to end 
this Punjabi controntation. Mr. Longowal the moderate 
leader who signed the accord stated: "The morcha has 
ended."132
Thus a major political crisis had been resolved by a 
relatively inexperienced Prime Minister who had used every 
effort to bring peace in this troubled region. Rajiv Gandhi 
immediately realized the past mistakes of his mother Indira 
Gandhi, and worked diligently to change that situation. 
"Luck, political manoeuvering and willingness to take risks" 
helped produce the historic accord that was reached.133
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Arjun Singh the Governor of Punjab stated vehemently, "we 
will not allow anybody to disturb the peace at this stage.
It is the general will of the people to see that these 
things do not occur."134
Hence, once again the Centre through its political 
manoeuvering, adroitly steered the situation away from 
violence and towards peaceful resolution between Punjab and 
New Delhi. These new methods of approaching the Sikh 
crisis, and a willingness to compromise aided the 
acceptability of the Centre's control, reach and powers to 
resolve the conflict in this region. There was relief that 
one of "India's worst crises appeared to be coming to an 
end.1,135
The Statesman reported that this was truly a tremendous 
achievement for a young and relatively inexperienced Prime 
Minister and Sant Harchant Singh Longowal, still head of the 
Akali Dal, hailed this settlement and claimed emphatically 
that "the period of confrontation is over."136
Analysis of the Situation
In analyzing the situation, we must note that beside 
the growth of communalism in Punjab the situation was 
exacerbated by miscalculations on the part of the Congress 
leadership.
There can be no doubt that the foundations of strong 
regional identity are present in Punjab. Language,
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religion, a sense of history, etc., all serve to reinforce 
such an identity. But the crisis of 1984 was not a product 
of regionalism alone; it was a product of regionalism fueled 
to the point of explosion by slights and oversights, and 
grievances ignored by the Central Government for over three 
decades, and in the end, by positive reinforcement of the 
Prime Minister herself in the strengthening of the most 
radical factions in the regional leadership.
Bhindranwale was the product of Congress politics 
rather than Akali ones. In March 1977 there was a general 
election which ended her emergency rule. On March 21, 1977, 
the London Times reported that "Mrs. Gandhi loses her seat 
in Congress disaster." In 1975 Mrs. Gandhi had declared an 
Emergency to save the country from chaos fomented by 
opposition parties and to give it instead, firm discipline 
and stable government. She vehemently repudiated the charge 
that the maintenance of her own rule was as strong a motive. 
However, the March 1977 elections displayed that her rule, 
her leadership, and her Emergency were rejected. The 
Congress Party, for the first time since independence, lost 
control of the government in New Delhi, and Mrs. Gandhi was 
put out of office by her overwhelming defeat in her own 
constituency.137 Later in 1977 when the Congress Party lost 
Punjab in state elections which were called in the wake of 
Mrs. Gandhi's own fall from power at the center, a coalition 
led by the moderate faction of the Akali's took over.138
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During this time, Bhindranwale and the radical elements of 
the Akali Party were consequently encouraged by Mrs. Gandhi 
and the other leading Congress politicians to demonstrate 
against the Akali government's secularism. This campaign 
reached its climax when many Bhindranwale supporters died 
while trying to storm a meeting of heretical Nirankaris, 
reported the London Times.139
After three years of rule by the opposition Janata 
Party, on January 8th 198 0, Mrs. Gandhi won a landslide 
victory in the Indian general elections. The governments of 
Mr. Desai and Mr. Charan Singh (1977-1979) had not taken any 
serious action to curb price rises nor did they attempt to 
educate the public about their causes during the long 
election campaign.140 Again in the wake of the general 
election, state elections were held. Hence, the Congress 
Party regained power in the Punjab in the 198 0, and 
Bhindranwale lost his "nuisance value." Unfortunately, for 
Mrs. Gandhi, he refused to be put back into his box.141 His 
fundamentalism had found its time. The Akalis, to 
counteract Bhindranwale's strong fundamentalist challenge 
were forced to adopt more extreme postures. Now in 
opposition, the Akalis launched a campaign for state 
autonomy. Thus, a serious miscalculation on Mrs. Gandhi's 
part, regarding Bhindranwale's political use, eventually 
cost the country thousands of lives.
Also, the growth of Sikh fundamentalism was ignored by
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the Congress leadership, who made no attempt to understand 
and curb this movement until it was totally out of hand.
Though it may look simplistic, conceptually, 
fundamentalism in Punjab's context could be described as an 
amalgam of religious fanaticism, separatism, and 
terrorism.142 The Fundamentalists' deep-seated hatred 
against the Nirankaris culminating in the assassination of 
Baba Gurbachan Singh, the spiritual head of the Nirankaris; 
their preference for baptized Sikhs over all others, spirit 
of intolerance toward all voices of dissent and finally 
their stance on the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, led them to
make demands of independence.143
Tully and Jacob conclude that it was Indira Gandhi's 
Congress Party which launched Bhindranwale, and it was her 
government which allowed him to usurp its role in the 
Punjab.144 If she had arrested Bhindranwale after the 
assassination of Deputy Inspector General of Police Atwal, 
on April 25, 198 3, there would have been no assault on the 
Akal Takht.145 Thus, it was Mrs. Gandhi's "indecisiveness" 
which aided the tragedy of Amritsar.146
Finally, we may note that Mrs. Gandhi actively 
encouraged the "darbar" or court around her.147 This durbar 
had a stultifying effect on the institutions of India. All 
power derived from the court in Delhi, but the courtiers 
often exercised their power independently.148 Inevitably,
the fawners and flatterers rose to the top and the
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independent-minded sank to the bottom.149 Hence, often the 
truth was hidden from the Prime Minister who made decisions 
based on false promises.
Harji Malik in states that "the politics of alienation" 
was in process and actively encouraged by the Congress (I) 
Party for political reasons.150 He stated that though we 
play lip service to our much vaunted "unity in diversity," 
Indian realpolitik is self-destructive in its intolerance of 
diversity, encouraged by the "deliberately cultivated bogey 
that diversity is synonymous with disintegration.1,151 Hindu 
fundamentalism, often explained as the "backlash" to Muslim 
and Sikh fundamentalism, is accepted by the majority 
community as their "right."152
Malik argues that Hindu-Sikh friction in the Punjab was 
essentially a power struggle between the Akali Dal and the 
Congress.153 Playing the old colonial "divide and rule" 
game, the Congress strategy was to split the Punjab 
electorate by encouraging both Hindu and Sikh 
communalism.154 Covert government support to splinter and 
fringe groups amongst the Sikhs and Nirankaris was also part 
of their plans.155 Apparently, Malik feels that P.M.
"Indira Gandhi and her government did not want a solution. 
Repeatedly, with the negotiations on the verge of success, 
the government reneged, on some excuse or the other."156
Malik states that the Congress party relied on the mass 
support of religious minorities but, for a variety of socio-
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economic reasons this base was gradually eroded. After the 1977 
election, a new appraisal, based on the majority Hindu vote as 
the safest possible vote bank, gradually took over.157
Malik argues further that another evil promulgated 
against the Sikhs was a well-planned disinformation campaign.
The disinformation campaign described the Sikh sense of identity 
as a British "creation" claiming that if the British had not laid 
stress on differences between Sikhs and Hindus, Sikhism would 
have relapsed back into the Hindu fold.158 Deliberately put on 
the defensive, Sikhs were forced to proclaim that they were not 
secessionists. The disinformation campaign served its dual 
purpose, it made the entire Sikh community suspect all over the 
country and increasingly alienated the Sikhs from the national 
mainstream of the community.159 However, having created its 
extreme "Frankenstein" the government lost control of events.160
It was only with the change in New Delhi's leadership 
that a metamorphosis in style and approach under the new Prime 
Minister (kajiv Gandhi) willing to make adjustments and 
compromises, that the situation was seemingly resolved.
September 1985 was the first time since the 192 0s that 
the Akali Dal had won a majority on its own in the Punjab.The 
voters in Punjab elected Sikh leaders who denounced extremism and 
pledged to work out their problems peacefully. Many politicians 
predicted that a party led by Sikhs would have a better chance 
than others to curb the violence in Punjab. Thus Rajiv Gandhi 
had once again managed to take control and help shape a
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potentially dangerous situation and bring the Punjabi leadership 
under New Delhi's wings.
Conclusion
In concluding, we have to take a middle path and note 
that the Congress government was certainly not beyond blame, but 
the claim of harassment of all Sikhs, and a well-planned 
disinformation campaign is not supported by what we know as the 
facts.
In the Punjab it appears that Mrs. Gandhi and the 
Congress leaders miscalculated the usefulness of Bhindranwale in 
causing a schism in the Akali Dal. Moreover, once Bhindranwale 
had made his position clear, Mrs. Gandhi failed to take the 
necessary action against him until Operation Blue Star.
Operation Blue Star was the ultimate signal of the failure of the 
government's earlier policies with respect to Punjab regionalism, 
and in its turn, it produced a Sikh backlash, which was followed 
by Hindu reprisals as the drama of political errors played out 
its awful logic. After 1985, with Rajiv at the helm, moderate 
Sikh demands were satisfied with the signing of the accord, and a 
measure of control has returned back into the hands of both, the 
Punjabi government and the Centre in New Delhi.
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Conclusion
In concluding this thesis we find that the theme of 
Indian politics has been one of "unity in diversity." This 
diversity, portrayed abundantly in the introduction, shows 
sharp distinctions between various tribes, religious, ethnic 
and cultural groups. Today with the help of the Indian 
government's educational and cultural programs and the 
improvement in mass communication and media exposure, these 
groups must reside in closer proximity to each other.
Previously, under the British Raj most groups lived 
with little knowledge of others, hence differences flared up 
only upon occasional contact. The British policy of divide 
and rule always worked well in the Raj.
Governmental programs and educational facilities in 
independent India not only aided the backward schedule 
castes and tribes but also the Punjabis who had lost their 
homeland in the 1947 partition. Perhaps a feeling of guilt 
pervaded governmental consciousness that extraordinary 
measures were needed to aid those disadvantaged groups.
Yet, when problems arose, the government's lack of swift 
action to tackle the issues and its support of partisan 
politics over national issues only exacerbated the 
disgruntled minorities, who took actions into their own
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hands.
Neither the Sikh problem nor the North East Indian 
issue are totally resolved today, and India is only now 
begining to recover from Mrs. Gandhi's assassination and the 
void in leadership that created. Though her son Rajiv has 
stepped in and shown promise, the problems of ethnicity are 
ever present.
In 1947 India promised to maintain a democratic form of 
government, and has kept this promise (except for a short 
period during which Emergency Rule was invoked). In a 
democracy "all men are created equal" and this equality was 
extended to the previously disadvantaged groups. Freedom of 
speech, as far as possible is also maintained so that the 
various groups and their grievances can be aired publicly. 
Hence, the Central Government tries to maintain some kind of 
balance in its dealings with its opponents. However, being 
a democracy, special electorates such as those previously 
maintained in the Punjab which caused the Sikhs to feel 
disadvantaged had to be abolished. Given such conditions, 
a new Punjabi state was created in 1966 with the Sikhs 
constituting a fifty-five percent majority.
In delving into the problem of regionalism in the two 
case studies, we find that the "power" factor appears as the 
common denominator in both the case studies. The loss of 
power felt by the Sikhs in losing control of their temples, 
special electorates, river water and a sense of identity
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developed into a feeling of hopelessness. Similarly in the 
North-East, the illegal migration, loss of jobs, land, and 
eventually what they perceived as an electoral majority 
brought on feelings of powerlessness. Therefore, when the 
Indian government did little to allay these fears, or by 
their actions making them worse, both minorities decided to 
take action into their own hands.
The two case studies support the view that when the 
leadership in New Delhi is slow to respond, and acts in a 
calculating and manipulative manner, fostering partisan 
rather than national interests in its dealings with regional 
issues, trouble ensues. This has been abundantly 
illustrated in both the case studies.
In North East India, rising expectations were blunted 
and the root cause appeared to point to the increasing tide 
of "foreigners" appropriating greater portions of land and 
jobs. New Delhi was extremely slow to respond to these 
regional problems because of the Congress Party's dependence 
on minority votes which included these foreigners. Thus the 
center's apathy toward swiftly resolving these issues 
brought on years of civil strife, Naga insurgency, Metei 
chauvinism and Mizo rebellion in these regions.
Similarly, in the Punjab, New Delhi's inertia towards 
dealing with the problems of parcelling the river waters and 
the control of Sikh temples only helped to aggravate the 
situation. However, the center's early encouragement of
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Jarnail Sangh Bhindrandwale for its own partisan purposes, 
and their failure to curb his increasing demands eventually 
led to Operation Bluestar and the assassination of Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi.
Yet, when the leadership in New Delhi is serious about 
addressing these problems and decides to tackle the issues 
at hand we find that the situation shows marked 
improvements.
With Rajiv Gandhi at the helm, accords were reached in 
both Assam and the Punjab in 1985. New elections based on a 
pre-1985 electorate was promised in Assam and the center 
worked toward decreasing civil strife in this region. A 
caretaker government was to be in control before new 
elections were undertaken. In addition, certain unspecified 
legislative and administrative safeguards were promised by 
the central government to protect the cultural, social, and 
linguistic identity and heritage of the Assamese people.
In Punjab, an accord with the moderates concluded 
months of uncertainty and mayhem in this region. New 
Delhi's concessions concerning Chandigarh made it the sole 
capital of Punjab. The central government agreed to pay 
compensation to families for all those killed in Sikh 
related disturbances since 1982. Rajiv Gandhi also promised 
to withdraw the Armed Forces Special Powers Act in Punjab 
which permitted search and arrest without a warrant.
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Thus, we find that regionalism is a serious problem in 
India which can be contained when the leadership in New 
Delhi is responsive and quick to act, however, if the center 
is manipulative and slow to respond, regional outbursts can 
become a tedious and protracted problem. Hence, the key to 
the problem lies in the hands of the central leadership in 
New Delhi and their approach to dealing with the regions.
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